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Abstract 
Depression is a highly prevalent, debilitating, and sometimes-fatal mental illness. Typically, 
its treatment approaches are conceptualised as a dichotomy between psychological and 
pharmaceutical. However, a new model, in line with cogent philosophical reasoning and 
recent empirical evidence, integrates these approaches. The cognitive neuropsychological 
model places affective processing biases as central to depression aetiology and treatment-in 
both biological psychiatry and cognitive psychology. One affective bias, emotion recognition, 
is central to the tenets of this model, which, unlike some cognitive theories, places improved 
affective biases as temporally prior to improved mood, and as the underlying mechanism of 
antidepressant action. To test this account of emotion recognition bias, 103 undergraduate 
students participants underwent negative, positive, and neutral mood induction in a between-
groups design to assess whether mood-congruent emotion recognition biases would emerge 
in a multimodal (facial, vocal, musical) emotion recognition battery, while controlling for 
depression symptoms and assessing maladaptive cognitive schemas. Few significant emotion 
recognition biases resulted, but significant negative correlations between negative schemas 
and overall facial and musical accuracy emerged, even when controlling for depression-
lending some support to the cognitive neuropsychological model ' s premise of a bilateral 
relationship between schemas and emotion recognition, both of which may play a substantial 
role in the etiology of depression. 
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Major depression is a highly prevalent, severely debilitating mental disorder that, in many 
cases, is fatal. More than a normal sad reaction to a distressing situation, it is a complex 
disorder of multiple aetiologies that, in addition to characteristic low mood or lack of interest 
in previously enjoyable activities (a requirement of either being necessary for diagnosis) 
affects sleep patterns, eating habits, executive functioning, and thoughts about oneself-to a 
degree that compromises everyday functioning (see Appendix A for full diagnostic criteria). 
At least 10% of South Africans will experience a depressive episode at some point in 
their lives (Myer et al., 2008; Richards, 2011); the latest edition of the Diagnostics and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) 
puts this figure at 7% for the United States population per year. Clearly, estimates vary 
(Ferrari et al., 2013), but undisputed is the fact that depression is an extremely common 
disorder-enough so for the World Health Organisation to list it as the leading cause of 
disability worldwide (World Health Organisation, 2012). In South Africa, similarly to other 
diseases, depression is most prevalent in those living in poverty (Lund et al., 2010) or with 
HIV (Pappin, Wouters, & Booysen, 2012; Simbayi et al., 2007), two groups which also 
receive the least access to care (Lund & Flisher, 2006). 
In purely economic terms, depression places an enormous burden on countries, 
primarily through losses in work productivity. The United States alone is estimated to have 
lost $83 billion in the year 2000 to depression (Birnbaum et al., 2003); the cost in Europe in 
2004 was estimated at an entire percentage of its combined gross domestic product : an 
astounding €118 billion (Sobocki, Jonsson, Angst, & Rehnberg, 2006). 
In more human terms, depression is the cause of approximately 90% of successful 
suicide attempts, which cause around 800 000 deaths annually worldwide (Rihrner, 2001 ). 
Unsuccessful attempts are far more common, often causing permanent physiological damage 
(Farmer, 1988) , and suicidal ideation is common in those with depression (Nock et al., 
2008). Even in those without this feature, depression greatly affects the quality of life of both 
sufferers (Angermeyer, Holzinger, Matschinger, & Stengler-Wenzke, 2002) and their 
families (Fadden, Bebbington, & Kuipers, 1987). 
Thus, there is good reason for the considerable, sustained research effort surrounding 
depression (as one indication, a PsychINFO title search for 'depression' returns over 50 000 
results), a large portion of which is ultimately aimed towards refining treatments for the 
disorder. The current thesis shares this aim. 
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Treatment Approaches 
Although the full research into depression aetiology is complex and extensive (see, 
e.g., Beck & Alford, 2009; Holzel, Harter, Reese, & Kriston, 2011; Sullivan, Neale, & 
Kendler, 2000, for reviews more extensive than possible here) the reality faced by patients 
and practitioners from the perspective of depression treatment is somewhat simpler. It is also 
from the examination of these approaches, and the theories that underpin them, that a novel 
neuropsychological question arises. 
The most commonly-recommended treatment for depression is of antidepressants or 
psychotherapy, or a combination thereof (Cuijpers, van Straten, Warmerdam, & Andersson, 
2009; Duval, Lebowitz, & Macher, 2011 ). This treatment approach is in line with most 
treatment guidelines (Davidson, 2010; Gelenberg, 2010), including those in South Africa (of 
the South African Society of Psychiatrists; Grobler, 2013). (The exceptions to this are in mild 
depression, where a minority recommend light exercise, and severe or treatment-resistant 
depression that may require electro-convulsive therapy) 
Psychopharmacology. Approximately one in ten people over age 12 in the United 
States is currently prescribed an antidepressant (Pratt, Brody, & Gu, 2011). Although 
antidepressants as a drug class are not new, their use increased exponentially after the 
licensing of the first selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRl) fluoxetine (original trade 
name: Prozac) in 1987 (although initial testing of the compound began in 1972; see Wong, 
Perry, & Bymaster, 2005, for a detailed, fascinating account ofthis research). As one 
indication: in primary care alone, antidepressant use increased over 300% between 1989 and 
2000 in the United States (Pirraglia, Stafford, & Singer, 2003). Similar trends are evident 
internationally, for example: in Australia, the increase in use between 1990 and 1998 was 
160% (McManus et al., 2000). 
Earlier antidepressants, discovered in the 1950s, target monoamines more broadly: 
Monoamine oxidase inhibitors reduce the breakdown of dopamine, epinephrine, melatonin, 
norepinephrine, phenethylamine, and serotonin. Tricyclic antidepressants primarily increase 
concentrations of serotonin and norepinephrine, but also agonise and antagonise several other 
receptors. It is this relative non-specificity that contributes to the severe side-effect profile 
and interactions of these drugs (Lopez-Mufi.oz & Alamo, 2009). 
The monoamine hypothesis. The dominant theory behind antidepressant action is, 
unsurprisingly, that depression is caused by a low level of monoarnines, and antidepressants 
ease depression symptoms by increasing levels of these neurotransmitters (Hinz, Stein, & 
Uncini, 2012; Hirschfeld, 2006). This hypothesis began as the similar catecholamine 
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hypothesis (Bunney, 1982; Schildkraut, 1965), which was expanded upon when research 
showed serotonin particularly (which is not a catecholamine) to be instrumental in depression 
treatment. 
This hypothesis, also referred to as the chemical imbalance hypothesis, is widely 
propagated (Lacasse & Leo, 2005), for at least three overlapping reasons. First, this 
explanation ties into the broader shift in psychiatry towards biological models of mental 
illness (Barondes, 1990), and their reification (Hyman, 2010), both of which lend themselves 
to biological (pharmaceutical) treatment. Second, it is clear that the monoamine hypothesis is 
both in the interests of, and actively promoted by, some pharmaceutical companies. The 
clearest example of this is in direct-to-consumer advertising in the United States, where some 
have explicitly advanced the term and explanation "chemical imbalance" (see, e.g., the 2003 
Zoloft television advertisement: http://youtu.be/huOON18aSGU). Creating the picture of a 
simple process with a straightforward, singular remedy is a sensible marketing strategy for 
those who are selling it (Lacasse & Leo, 2005; Leo & Lacasse, 2007). (This is in no way 
meant as an ethical judgement of "Big Pharma".) Third, the hypothesis allows for a reduction 
in the stigma associated with mental illness (but perhaps at the cost of worsened perceived 
prognosis by patients; Deacon & Baird, 2009). Thus, explanations citing a chemical 
imbalance frequently appear in public information leaflets ( e.g., the depression brochure of 
the South African Depression and Anxiety Group; SADAG, n.d.) and this explanation (and 
treatment approach) is preferred by some patients (France, Lysaker, & Robinson, 2007). 
Despite its widespread reach, the monoamine hypothesis, in its simplest form (that 
depression is caused by low levels of monoamines) is largely untenable. From the 
observation that increased monoamine concentrations alleviate depressive symptoms, it does 
not follow that low monoamines are the cause of these symptoms (Hindmarch, 2001). 
Although similar reasoning does hold true in some cases (e.g., vitamin deficiencies), 
additional evidence is needed before drawing causation. Consider, for instance, the role of 
low-dose opioids in effective headache treatment: increased opioid concentration often results 
in headache relief-but it would be absurd to conclude from this that headaches are caused 
by an 'opioid imbalance'. Indeed, empirically, some research finds that there is no correlation 
between measures of monoarnines and depression in non-medicated individuals (Hayward, 
Goodwin, Cowen, & Harmer, 2005; Hinz et al., 2012; Leyton et al. , 1997). Further, the 
monoamine hypothesis fails to account for the delay of therapeutic response in antidepressant 
treatment- monoamine levels increase hours after the first dose, but reduction in depression 
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symptoms only follow weeks later (Harmer, Goodwin, & Cowen, 2009). An alternative to the 
monoamine hypothesis is discussed later. 
Psychotherapy. Many variants of psychotherapy exist (Norcross, Koocher, & 
Garofalo, 2006) that, contrary to earlier claims (Wampold et al. , 1997) are likely not 
empirically equivalent (Budd & Hughes, 2009). More importantly, not all are logically 
equivalent, and pseudoscience abounds in this area (Beyerstein, 2001 ; Lilienfeld, Jay Lynn, 
& Lohr, 2003; Lilienfeld, 2010). For example: Even if some of Freud' s principles now appear 
to have elements of neuroscientific support (Turnbull & Solms, 2007), this cannot 
retrospectively validate (see Clifford, 1877/1999) a method that was never based on scientific 
principles (Lattey, 1969; Webster, 2005). More plainly: These theories never constituted 
knowledge, as without evidence they did not meet the necessary (yet perhaps not sufficient; 
Gettier, 1963) requirements of being justified, true beliefs at the time (Dawson, 1981 ). 
In fact, the framework of interest here, Beck' s cognitive theory (Beck, 2005), 
emerged when an empirical investigation into an assumption of psychoanalysis proved false. 
Specifically: Psychoanalysis suggested that depression is associated with self-directed 
hostility in patients (Clewell, 2004; Freud, trans. 2005); however, Beck found more hostility 
in the dream content of non-depressed individuals than patients. Instead, what emerged in 
depressed patients' dreams were consistent themes of loss and abandonment-themes that 
were also present in their waking thoughts. Commonly, the conscious thoughts and self-
appraisals of his patients contained negatively-biased distortions about themselves, their 
environment, and their future (Beck, 1961 ; but for a comprehensive retrospective see Beck & 
Alford, 2009). In finding that correcting these negative (and often factually incorrect) 
thoughts could facilitate remission of depression in as few as 10 sessions (Beck, 1967), 
Beck's iteration of cognitive therapy emerged. Although several evidence-based cognitive 
theories and therapies exist- it would be wrong not to mention the earlier, isolated, work of 
Albert Ellis and his Rational Emotive Therapy (Ellis, 1957; Ellis, 1980~the work of Beck is 
particularly appealing because of his continued interest in emerging interdisciplinary 
evidence (Beck, 2008) and work with schemas, discussed later. 
Combined with elements of behaviour therapy, which (as its name suggests) applies 
behavioural principles to drive therapeutic response (for an overview see Grossberg, 1964), 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) is demonstrably effective in the treatment of depression 
and other psychiatric disorders (Butler, Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006; Hofmann, Asnaani, 
Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012). Partially because of its short time to therapeutic response 
compared to other psychotherapies (Churchill et al. , 2002), and its suitability to computer-
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based online administration (Andersson & Cuijpers, 2009; Richards & Richardson, 2012; 
which is often employed in the United Kingdom, see www.beatingtheblues.co.uk), is often the 
first-recommended psychotherapy. As one example: The UK National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines recommend CBT as the treatment of choice for mild to 
moderate depression (and in combination with antidepressant therapy for severe depression; 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2009). 
Cognitive theory and schemas. Expanding on the basic premise of cognitive theory-
that incorrect beliefs are related to depression symptoms- Beck applied the concept of 
schemas ( or schemata) in the context of depression. Although the concept of schemas was 
not new, with its formulation originating with Kant and later adopted by Piaget, among others 
(see Dahlin, 2001 , for a critical historical overview), Beck uniquely theorised how these 
relatively-persistent frameworks for interpreting information about oneself and the 
environment would influence mood. Thus, negative schemas would lead to a corresponding 
negative interpretation of stimuli- facilitating depression (Beck & Alford, 2009). 
These schemas can be expressed in statements, such as "I am a failure", which may be 
latent until a relevant event ( e.g., a poor grade on an exam) leads to its activation, in turn 
activating a more global negative processing biases (Beck, 2008).As for how negative 
schemas originate, Beck posits that negative life events, particularly in childhood, establish 
these interpretive frameworks- which may be reinforced with repeated activation by stressful 
events (Beck, 2005). This explanation, presented in Figure 1 ( overleaf), provides a model in 
which the high correlation between childhood abuse and later depression can fit (Cukor & 
McGinn, 2006). Some variants of cognitive therapy seek to uncover and target maladaptive 
schemas directly; perhaps the most prominent of these being the work by Young and 
colleagues (e.g., Kellogg & Young, 2006; Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). 
As with pharmacological treatments, patients may prefer talk therapy for specific 
reasons (Chilvers, Dewey, Fielding, & Gretton, 2001), commonly including an aversion to 
( or misunderstanding of) antidepressants, or the belief that psychotherapy will resolve the 
' true ' cause of the disorder- which is conceptualised in psychological rather than biological 
terms (Dwight-Johnson, Sherbourne, Liao, & Wells, 2000; van Schaik et al. , 2004). 
Unsurprisingly, a mismatch between patient beliefs and preferences with the provided 
treatment leads to poorer adherence (Kwan, Dirnidjian, & Rizvi, 2010; Swoiskin, 2001a). 
Adverse 
Dysfunctional Pervasive 
.... schemas: Activation by negative developmental ~ stressful events f+ 
experiences 
cognitive cognitive bias: 
vulnerability depression 
Figure I .A developmental model of depression showing the vulnerability diathesis-stress 
model of schema activation. Adapted from "The Evolution of the Cognitive Model of 
Depression and its Neurobiological Correlates" by A. T. Beck, 2008, American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 165, p. 969-977. 
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Dualism and a false dichotomy. Thus, for many (patients and health practitioners 
alike) a dichotomy often exists in depression treatment and conceptualisation. This thinking 
was explicit in the first edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1952), which 
differentiated between organic and reactive depression. The DSM-II (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1968) continued this divide, to a lesser extent, with the psychoanalytic terms 
neurotic and psychotic depression-but with a similar distinction in meaning. Theory held 
that so-called organic depression necessitated pharmacological treatment, whereas reactive 
depression was more responsive to psychotherapy (Parker, 2000). This distinction ceased 
from the third edition of the manual (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), in line with its 
supposedly atheoretical, or theoretically-agnostic, approach to the aetiology of listed 
disorders. (However, whether these subsequent editions are truly atheoretical--or if such a 
position is even possible- is debatable; Follette & Houts, 1996; Rogler, 1997) 
Undeniably, then, various social forces play a role in the conceptualisation of mental 
illness (Bentall, 2005; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007). The full nuances of the changes to 
depression as a diagnostic category are too detailed to adequately convey here, but the reader 
is encouraged to consult McPherson and Armstrong' s (2006) excellent study of the diagnostic 
labelling of depression over time for greater context. Besides space constraints, this is 
excluded because, unfortunately, such great external influence is not easily changed. 
However, faulty logic is far easier to expose. 
Another prominent reason for the above-mentioned dichotomy stems from an 
underlying acceptance, or even propagation, of a specific philosophy of mind, Cartesian 
dualism, which posits the mind and body as two discrete entities (Brenner, Roder, & 
Tschacher, 2006). Despite being both logically (Searle, 2008) and empirically (Panksepp, 
2005) flawed, dualism persists both with the majority of the general public, and a sizeable 
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portion of health professionals (Demertzi et al. , 2009). Its acceptance is problematic for 
patient care in broader medicine (Leder, 1984; Switankowsky, 2000), but especially so for 
psychology and psychiatry (Gabbard, 2000), where commercial interests may have had undue 
influence on dualism's persistence: As alluded to above, some in the pharmaceutical industry 
have emphasised exclusively biological interpretations of disease (Mehta, 2011), and some 
branches of psychotherapy continue to argue that exclusively cognitive explanations are 
superior (Purcell, 2008; Swoiskin, 2001a, 2001b). 
Although there is certainly no consensus within the discipline of philosophy of mind, 
one particular alternative to dualism fits available neurological evidence congruently: dual-
aspect monism. That is, what we refer to as mind and brain are ultimately referents to an 
identical entity; the former experienced subjectively, and the latter observed objectively 
(Diaz, 2000; Solms & Turnbull, 2011 ). Simply put: the question of whether depression is a 
malady of mind or brain (body) is ultimately nonsensical one-the answer is simultaneously 
both. As such, we should fully expect that depression or, in fact, any other subjective 
experience, correlates with observable brain changes, as these changes, rather than causal 
evidence for the experience, are the exact thing that the individual is feeling-observed 
objectively (Hardcastle, 1992). 
Not merely a philosophical aside, this fundamental concept allows for a far more 
nuanced view of depression aetiology and treatment. 
The cognitive neuropsychological model. As seen above, antidepressants do not 
effect clinical change linearly through an increase in monoamines-but they are effective in 
depression treatment (Fournier, Derubeis, Hollon, Shelton, & Fawcett, 2010; Nierenberg et 
al. , 2008, but see Turner et al. , 2008 on publication bias and Vohringer & Ghaemi, 2011 on 
effect sizes.) How, then, does this change occur? Some authors have pointed to neurogenesis 
(Eyre & Baune, 2012; Willner, Scheel-Kruger, & Belzung, 2013), especially hippocampal 
repair (Hanson, Owens, & Nemeroff, 2011; Santarelli et al. , 2003). This line ofresearch is 
promising and fascinating, but a new model integrates multiples lines of cognitive and 
biological evidence in a congruent way that provides novel, testable, hypotheses relevant to 
neuropsychology. 
Although mood-related changes in depression symptoms are not evident for several 
days following antidepressant treatment, subtle changes in cognitive biases are evident after 
even the first dose--even in non-depressed individuals. For example, a 20mg dose of 
citalopram (an SSRI) reduced amygdala response to fearful facial expressions only three 
hours after administration (Murphy, Norbury, O' Sullivan, Cowen, & Harmer, 2009) in non-
depressed volunteers. Similarly, a single 20mg dose of citalopram influenced the 
electrophysiological response ( event-related potentials) of facial emotion decoding for 
positive emotions, showing that this dose created a perceptual bias towards the positive 
stimuli (Kerestes et al. , 2009). In depressed patients, citalopram showed to increase 
recognition of happiness and surprise in two weeks- and the extent to which this occurred 
predicted positive treatment outcomes at six weeks (Tranter et al. , 2009). In the other 
direction, acute tryptophan depletion (which, being a precursor of serotonin, leads to 
markedly reduced serotonin levels) results in the resurfacing of cognitive biases- including 
impaired recognition of happy facial expression-in remitted depressed individuals, but not 
in never-depressed controls (Hayward et al. , 2005). Thus, a simple linear relationship 
between monoarnine levels and mood seems unlikely. 
Below, Figure 2 shows a comparison of the commonly-accepted view of 
antidepressant action versus the pathway proposed by the cognitive neuropsychological 
model. 
(a) 
Increased Delay Neuroadaptive - Improved Change in 
serotonin 
. 
effects mood - emotional bias 
(b) 
Increased Delay Neuroadaptive 
serotonin effects 
l 
Change in Delay Improved 
emotional bias mood 
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Figure 2. Comparison of the accepted view of mechanism underlying the delay in 
antidepressant action (a), and the pathway proposed by the cognitive neuropsychological 
model (b). Adapted from "Why do Antidepressants Take so Long to Work? A Cognitive 
Neuropsychological Model of Antidepressant Drug Action," by C. Harmer, G. Woodwin, and 
P. Cowen, 2009, The British Journal of Psychiatry, 19 5, p. 103. 
Importantly, the cognitive neuropsychological model places changes in emotional bias 
as integral (and temporally prior) to improved mood, whereas other accounts place changes in 
emotional bias as a consequence of improved mood, which itself follows directly from 
downstream neuroadaptive effects. An extended version of the cognitive neuropsychological 
model is shown in Figure 3 below. Here, uniquely, is a formulation of how biological and 
cognitive influences interact at different levels of processing. 
Genetic influences on Environmental influences 
monoamine transmission on monoamine 
(e.g., 5-HTILPR) transmission (e.g., 
redundancy, loss) 
~ // 
Compromised monoamine influence on brain circuits 
mediating affective processing. 
J ~ Mt;d,,pce=ots "'" 
disrupted monoamine 
ansmission and low-level 
\ negative affective biases Low-level (bottom-up) biases towards negative stimuli and 
• away from positive stimuli, instantiated by brain circuits 
Impaired cognitive control 
mediating affective perception 
(relative to degree of Preserved cognitive 
negative affective bias) control (relative to degree 
promotes vulnerability of negative affective bias) 
Dysfunctional negative schemas 
promotes resilience 
~ gnitive therapies treat 
dysfunctional schemas and 
high-level negative 
\ affective biases High level (top-down) biases towards negative stimuli and • away from positive stimuli, instantiated by circuits mediating 
affective cognitive control 
14 
Figure 3. The extended cognitive neuropsychological model of depression. Red boxes 
represent factors contributing to the onset and progression of depression symptoms; green 
boxes represent factors in depression treatment. 5-HTTLPR: serotonin transporter-linked 
polymorphic region. Adapted from "Cognitive mechanisms of treatment in depression" by J. 
Rosier, R. Elliot, and B. Shakian, 2012, Neuropsychopharmaco/ogy, 37, p.119. 
Uniquely, the cognitive neuropsychological model provides a framework for affective 
biases being central in depression onset and treatment-in both talk therapy and 
pharmacological approaches. In the latter instance, this model contends that the time delay 
seen antidepressants is in part because of the need for patients to fust interact with the world 
while holding their new positively-valenced processing biases (Harmer et al. , 2009). 
Further evidence for this position comes from research into relapse rates across 
treatment approaches: After cessation of either treatment, psychotherapy typically shows 
lower rates ofrelapse over time (Hollon, 2005). Part of the reason for this is likely that 
reversal of negative low-level biases with antidepressant treatment persists only for as long as 
medication is continued; conversely, improvement of negative schemas with cognitive 
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therapy often persists after treatment (Nierenberg, 2003). Also more understandable by this 
view is the consistent finding (Blackburn, Bishop, Glen, Whalley, & Christie, 1981 ; Keller et 
al., 2000; Melvin et al. , 2006) that a combination of psychotherapy and antidepressant 
treatment is often more effective than either treatment alone. By the cognitive 
neuropsychological model, this is explained by psychotherapy being more effective at 
changing schemas (top-down) when automatic processing biases are being influenced 
(bottom-up) by antidepressant action. 
Thus, rather than two competing frameworks for understanding depression aetiology 
and treatment, the cognitive neuropsychological model provides a consistent explanation of 
both psychological and pharmaceutical approaches to depression-as is, a priori, expected 
from broader philosophy of mind-and one which places neuropsychology in a privileged 
place for depression research and treatment. 
Cognitive Biases in Depression 
What, then, is the extent of cognitive bias and deficit in depression? Broadly, 
maladaptive schemas, and the DSM-S's criterion of diminished attention (stated more 
precisely as" diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day"; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) are already mentioned above-yet they fail to 
convey fully the extent of deficit (and the corresponding research base) in the disorder. 
It can be useful to separate general deficits in depression from those more-specific to 
emotional content-although these are not always mutually exclusive. Take, for example, the 
example of executive dysfunction: Executive functioning is a broad term for high level 
cognitive control processes, which are frequently impaired in depressed individuals (Biringer 
et al., 2005; Snyder, 2012). However, it is possible that these impairments are (at least partly) 
the result of rumination-the compulsive focus of attention towards negative thoughts 
(Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 2009; Philippot & Brutoux, 2008; Watkins & Brown, 2002). 
Being, primarily, a disorder of maladaptive mood, this lack of clear distinction should 
perhaps be no surprise-yet other general deficits (lacking emotional content) also exist. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive review of these is in a recent meta-analysis (Rock, Roiser, 
Riedel, & Blackwell, 2014) that, for consistency, included only studies that employed the 
Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB; see Sahakian & Owen, 
1992). In sum (and in line with other research, e.g., Weiland-Fiedler et al. , 2004), 
unmedicated depressed patients showed impairments on working memory, set-shifting, 
associative learning, pattern recognition memory, spatial recognition memory, and rapid 
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visual information processing ( a measure of attention). However, some ( e.g., Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010) show that at least some of these observed effects are negated when tasks are 
administered in a more structured fashion, eliminating the possibility of rumination to 
influence task performance. 
Where emotional content is involved, a general picture emerges of increased attention 
and preoccupation towards negative stimuli (Hamilton & Gotlib, 2008; Levens & Gotlib, 
2010). Specifically, in free recall, depressed participants show fewer recollections of positive 
autobiographical memories (K. D. Young et al. , 2012), instead recalling more general 
negative categories of events (Williams et al. , 2007). Similarly, depressed individuals show a 
tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli in a negative light (Hamilton & Gotlib, 2008). 
Similarly, in eye-tracking studies, depressed participants, although not more likely to orient 
towards negative stimuli, took longer to disengage from negative stimuli once focused 
thereupon (Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010; Caseras, Gamer, Bradley, & Mogg, 
2007). One specific subset of cognitive bias, though, is of particular interest to the predictions 
of the cognitive neuropsychological model. 
Emotion recognition biases. Unlike more general deficits such as in attention and 
memory, emotion recognition biases represent a practical, interpersonal level of cognitive 
distortion-which is also closely linked to cognitive theory. 
Facial emotion recognition biases. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of emotion recognition 
research (in depression and otherwise) has relied on visual stimuli (Song, You, Li, & Chen, 
2008). Faces are highly salient stimuli- the result of the evolution of specialised neural 
circuits dedicated to their processing ( e.g., the fusiform face area; Kanwisher, McDermott, & 
Chun, 1997}-and provide a convenient means of reading the mental state of others (R. T. 
Schultz, 2001). In line with this evolved nature, a substantial research effort, dating back to 
Charles Darwin (1872/1904) shows uniformity in fundamental emotion displays not only 
across disparate cultures- but also species. The landmark work of Ekman (e.g, Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971 ; Ekman, 1992) showed that six basic emotions ( anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, and surprise) are universally recognisable in healthy humans-even those in 
culturally-sheltered environments, such as Papua New Guinea (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 
1969). 
A simplistic view of the biases seen in depression, supported by some evidence- and 
in line with other negative biases in the disorder, is that depressed individuals show decreased 
accuracy in identifying happy faces (Milders, Bell , Platt, Serrano, & Runcie, 2010), increased 
accuracy in identifying sad faces (Leppanen, Milders, Bell, Terriere, & Hietanen, 2004), and 
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a bias towards interpreting neutral faces as sad (Gray et al. , 2006), as well as judging negative 
stimuli as more intense and positive stimuli as less so (Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 
2008; Yoon, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2009). However, not all research supports this 
straightforward account. 
Findings are contradictory regarding the identification of specific emotions. In 
negative stimuli, there is some evidence that depressed individuals are more accurate at 
identifying sad faces than nondepressed controls (Gollan, McCloskey, Hoxha, & Coccaro, 
2010; Leppanen et al. , 2004; Milders et al., 2010). However, others find that depressed 
individuals are worse than controls at identifying sad faces (Csukly, Czobor, Szily, Takacs, & 
Simon, 2009). 
For positive stimuli, depressed individuals make more errors in identifying happy 
faces than controls (Csukly et al. , 2011; Milders et al. , 2010; Surguladze et al. , 2004) but in at 
least one case (Surguladze et al. , 2004) depressed individuals made relatively more errors in 
identifying sad faces-contrary to what a general negative bias would predict. These 
findings lend some support to the suggestion that depression may carry a non-specific deficit 
in emotion recognition, where depressed individuals have relative difficulty in accurately 
identifying all emotions (Bourke, Douglas, & Porter, 2010). However, other research 
(Gollan, Pane, McCloskey, & Coccaro, 2008; Leppanen et al., 2004) has found no deficit in 
recognition accuracy in depressed participants relative to controls. 
Studies using neutral stimuli, however, tend to find more consistent results, with 
depressed participants more likely to interpret neutral faces as sad than controls (Gollan et al. , 
2008; Leppanen et al. , 2004) 
Happy, sad, and neutral facial expressions are, of course, not the full range of facial 
emotion expression- though far fewer studies have directly addressed the recognition of 
other emotions in depression. For example, one study found no difference in fear recognition 
accuracy in depressed patients (Kan, Mimura, Karnijima, & Kawamura, 2004). Similarly, 
other studies have found no specific bias towards angry faces (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & 
Joormann, 2004; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). 
Limitations of facial recognition studies. Cognitive theory predicts that there should 
exist a negatively-skewed bias in facial emotion recognition in depressed participants-yet, 
as seen above, existing research is ambiguous. There are several reasons why this may be the 
case, and why facial stimuli alone are insufficient, including: ceiling effects, inconsistent 
stimuli across studies, the effects of antidepressants, and over-arching global deficits. 
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Precisely because facial expressions are such salient stimuli (Fasel & Luettin, 2003), 
it is perhaps unsurprising that studies using stereotypical, unambiguous stimuli would 
encounter a ceiling effect (Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina, & Traue, 2010). For this 
reason, many studies use more subtle stimuli-typically digitally-morphed photos that 
combine neutral expressions with stereotypical displays to create a range of emotional 
intensities. A common example of this is morphed versions ofEkman's Pictures of Facial 
Affect (POFA; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; discussed later). The Facial Expressions of Emotion: 
Stimuli and Test (FEEST; A. Young, Perret, Calder, Sprengelmeyer, & Ekman, 2002) 
morphs the POF A not with neutral expressions, but rather with other emotions-creating a 
so-called 'emotion hexagon'. The immediately-apparent trouble with this approach is that, 
objectively, the resulting images do not represent any particular emotion, and completely lack 
ecological validity. Similarly, some other studies employ computer-generated faces (Papesh 
& Goldinger, 2009) or very basic stick-figure line drawings (Hale, Jansen, Bouhuys, & van 
den Hoofdakker, 1998; Hale, 1998). Thus, studies employing such vastly different stimuli are 
not directly comparable. 
Further, as outlined above in the cognitive neuropsychological hypothesis, 
antidepressant treatment alters emotion perception in depressed individuals-likely aiding to 
correct any pre-existing emotion recognition biases. However, very few of the above-
mentioned studies attempt to control for this effect ( or, indeed, even acknowledge it). 
Consequently, a lack of observed emotion recognition bias may instead be a reflection of 
effective antidepressant action in some studies (Harmer, Cowen, & Goodwin, 2011). 
Because emotion recognition is a process reliant on other processes, some of the 
deficits seen may be due to underlying impairments unrelated to negatively-oriented 
cognitive biases. As mentioned above, impaired executive dysfunction is one such process-
but, again, it is possible that the executive impairments seen are due to excessive occupation 
with negative stimuli (Philippot & Brutoux, 2008). Specific to facial (visual) stimuli, 
however, is the finding that gaze behaviour may explain at least some of the deficits seen in 
emotion recognition in depression. Negative mood states, common in depression, is 
associated with detailed processing of separate visual elements (local processing), and happy 
mood with the integration of elements (global processing; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Kimchi & 
Palmer, 1982). Where faces are concerned, this equates to a greater focus on the eyes and 
nose in local processing, and a focus on all facial features in global processing. Because 
mouth movement (i.e., smiling) is more essential for recognising happiness, the local 
processing associated with sad mood could lead to diminished identification of happy faces 
by virtue of primary perception alone-a hypothesis with some empirical support from a 
mood-induction eye-tracking study with non-depressed participants (Schmid, Schmid Mast, 
Bombari, Mast, & Lobmaier, 2011). 
Vocal emotion recognition biases. Studies employing vocal emotion recognition 
tasks are able to circumvent the possible confound of gaze behaviour found in facial 
recognition tasks. 
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Similarly to facial emotion studies, studies vary- with some finding a general deficit 
in vocal emotion recognition (Peron et al. , 2011 ; Uekermann, Abdel-hamid, Lehmkamper, 
Vollmoeller, & Daum, 2008), and others finding depressed participants to show a negative 
bias only for neutral stimuli (Kan et al. , 2004), and judging negative emotions as more 
intense than positive ones (Naranjo et al. , 2011) relative to controls. 
The literature here, however, is comparably much scarcer than facial emotion 
research, and features highly disparate stimuli-owing to the greater complexity of vocal 
emotion: Whereas facial emotion displays comprise of facial configuration only, vocal 
emotion contains both tone of voice (prosody) and its semantic content in words. In general, 
two options exist for vocal stimuli: creating stimuli with no semantic content (in the form of 
monosyllabic outbursts, or nonsense words or phrases), or using language with semantic 
content. 
The inclusion of semantic content can, arguably, result in a very different research 
question than by testing prosody judgement only, especially if there is incongruence between 
the spoken words and their emotional intonation. Indeed, a study that used this paradigm 
(Uekermann et al. , 2008) concluded that impaired executive functions likely caused the 
observed effect- which is unsurprising when considering the task difficulty of, for instance, 
identifying prosody while ignoring incongruent semantic content. (In fact, this paradigm 
bears similarities to the structure of a common measure of executive function, the Stroop test; 
Stroop, 1935). Further discussion and motivation for semantically-empty tasks follows in 
Methods. 
Musical emotion recognition biases. Vocal expressions are not the only auditory 
emotional stimuli; music is both a highly expressive means of communicating emotion 
(Juslin & Laukka, 2003 ; Juslin, 2000) that is recognised universally (Fritz et al. , 2009) and, 
more recently, forms the basis of a standardised emotion recognition stimulus set (Vieillard et 
al. , 2008; described in more detail in Methods). Unlike vocal and facial stimuli, these stimuli 
are unique in that they are far less interpersonal in nature-thus potentially making them less 
prone to cognitive biases. 
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Contrary to what traditional cognitive theory would expect (because it is relatively 
lower-level, not involving maladaptive beliefs about people in which the depressed are in 
contact) however, similar biases to those seen in facial and vocal stimuli are also present in 
musical stimuli: Depressed individuals are less accurate at identifying happy and peaceful 
(neutral) excerpts (Naranjo et al. , 2011), rate sad and fearful clips as more intense, and happy 
and peaceful excerpts as less intense than controls (Naranjo et al. , 2011; Punkanen, Eerola, & 
Erkkila, 2011 ). 
What do Emotion Recognition Biases Mean? 
Biased emotion recognition exists in depression that, at least by some studies, aligns 
with predictions from cognitive theory- with depressed individuals showing a negatively-
skewed bias towards stimuli. Some evidence (Csukly et al. , 2011) empirically links bias 
severity with cognitive schemas-but the effect sizes in this study are small and, as just 
mentioned, the existence of biases in impersonal (musical) stimuli does not align consistently 
with aspects of cognitive theory that posits attentional biases as high-level, interpretive 
biases. Complicating the current view even further, though, is the recent finding that emotion 
recognition biases can be elicited in non-depressed individuals via mood-induction. 
Incidental mood and emotion recognition. It is somewhat surprising that the finding 
that incidental mood influences emotion recognition is a recent one (Lee, Ng, Tang, & Chan, 
2008), given that mood-induction techniques have been used for some time in depressed 
samples to elicit various depression symptoms (Gross & Person, 1998). To date, only two 
published studies directly aimed at this question exist- and both have shortcomings. 
The first study of this kind (Lee et al. , 2008) assessed the facial emotion recognition 
abilities of 4 7 non-depressed participants following either happy, sad, or neutral mood 
induction. Participants in the sad mood-induction showed a negative bias towards ambiguous 
stimuli compared with the other groups. However, the small sample size limited other 
analytical possibilities, and the stimuli used were not ideal: photos unique to their research 
team were morphed across emotions instead of with a neutral condition. 
A more-recent study (Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010) improved on the above study by 
increasing the sample size to 93 . Only sad and happy faces were used, selected from the 
POF A, and were morphed with neutral faces to create varying emotion intensities. Besides 
these improvements, though, the method was not optimal. Particularly: supposedly as part of 
the mood-induction procedure, mood-congruent music was played during the experimental 
condition. Rather than, or in addition to, inducing mood, it is likely that this music served as a 
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contextual clue for interpreting ambiguous faces. In addition, no intensity rating scale was 
provided, and participants simply had to identify the mood in the faces (happy or sad). 
Especially since only two conditions were present, this method does not allow for a nuanced 
view of the recognition abilities of the participants. Lastly, participants were not screened for 
(and therefore not balanced on) depression symptoms. 
The need f or a better method. Perhaps the most obvious limitation of the above two 
studies is that they were only conducted in the visual domain. As mentioned above, facial 
emotion recognition may be mediated influenced by gaze behaviour, which is in turn 
susceptible to the influence of transient mood. Thus, the biases observed in induced mood in 
normal participants may not hold for other modalities. The addition of a vocal emotion 
recognition task would answer this question. The addition of the final domain of emotion 
recognition, music, would allow for statistical comparisons across all three modalities-
something that is only available in a minority of cases in the depression literature, and a first 
using normal participants. 
Aims and Hypotheses 
Plainly stated, the main aim here is to determine whether the types of emotion 
recognition biases seen in depression can be elicited in non-depressed individuals via a 
mood-induction paradigm. The cognitive neuropsychological model and the traditional 
cognitive model place emotion recognition biases at different temporal points; assessing the 
malleability of these biases by mood alone would assist in determining which causal 
framework is more likely, and perhaps aid depression treatment research. 
Specifically, my hypotheses are: 
• Contrary to what some cognitive theory predicts (Csukly et al. , 2011), emotion 
recognition biases will emerge in non-depressed individuals across three modalities, 
when subjected to a mood-induction procedure. 
• The above-mentioned biases will be mood-congruent; sad mood induction will elicit 
negative biases, and happy mood induction will elicit positive biases. 
• Although biases will be present in the absence of negative schemas, where schemas 
are present, they will be associated with negative biases-in the Neutral induction 
condition (because this condition is the only one not confounded by mood induction 
that can trigger low-lying schemas). 
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Method 
Design and Setting 
The experiment was an independent measures design across three groups, namely: 
positive, negative, and neutral mood induction. Although a repeated-measures design would 
have been statistically superior in theory, in practice the high time commitment required of 
participants in such a design would have led to an unworkably high dropout rate. Instead, 
participants were matched as carefully as possible on depression scores, gender, and race to 
control for between-participant variability. Groups were compared on emotion recognition 
accuracy and intensity ratings. 
All research was conducted in the Psychology Department at the University of Cape 
Town. 
Participants 
The final sample comprised 103 participants, all psychology undergraduates at the 




Positive Negative Neutral 
Variable (n = 35) (n = 33) (n = 35) F(2, 100)/r p 
Age 20.00 (1 .55) 19.36 (1.31) 19.80 (1.56) 1.61 .22 
BDI-II 7.02 (5.01) 7.27 (4.11) 7.57 (4.70) .12 .88 
Female 31 28 31 .20 .90 
Male 4 5 4 .15 .92 
Black 8 8 9 .08 .96 
Coloured 8 8 8 .00 1.00 
White 19 17 18 .11 .95 
Note: Means and standard deviations are provided for Age and BDI-11 score; frequencies are provided for other 
demographics. 
Recruitment. Participants were recruited via the Student Research Participation 
Programme (SRPP) of the Psychology Department at the University of Cape Town. 
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Notices of the study appeared on the administration website of the SRPP website 
during April to November 2013. Any psychology student aged between 18-30, of any gender, 
not taking antidepressant medication was invited to fill in the online screening form, which 
consisted of a computerised version of the Beck Depression Inventory, Second Edition (BDI-
II; Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996), as well as a basic demographic questionnaire, asking 
participants their age, race, and gender. 
In total, 799 unique responses were collected via the online form. Potential 
participants could complete the form at any point throughout the data collection period of the 
study. Although this was not ideal for matching purposes, doing so was unavoidable due to 
fluctuating participant availability and time constraints. 
All eligible participants were added to a microsite in which the study' s administration 
took place. Available assessment times appeared on this site, and all members of the site had 
the option to sign up for a time-slot, although there were inevitably more members of the 
group than available times. This excess of participants was unavoidable as participant 
availability did not always match researcher availability. Additionally, many of those eligible 
for the study instead chose to complete other studies available at the university. Participants 
were awarded SRPP points (non-graded course credits) for their efforts. 
Materials and Apparatus 
Depression measure. The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996) served as the 
sole measure of depression in both screening and experimental phases of the study. The 
scale is based on the Diagnostic and Statistial Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition 
(DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for depression. The introduction 
of the DSM-5 does not, a priori, affect the validity of this scale, because neither the core 
symptoms of major depressive disorder, nor the duration necessary for diagnosis thereof, 
have changed with the revision. In line with the diagnostic criteria, the scale focuses on 
emotional and behavioural changes in the two weeks preceding administration. The total 
score ranges from Oto 63, with established cut-off scores for different severity levels: 0-13 
indicates minimal depression, 14-19 mild depression, 20-28 moderate depression, and above 
29 signifies severe depression. Of course, situational factors may affect scores on this 
measure, but arguable not to such an extent to compromise its usefulness in this study. 
A recent, extensive review (Wang & Gorenstein, 2013) of the psychometric properties 
of the BDI-II shows its internal consistency to average 0.9, and the test-retest reliability to 
range from 0.73 to 0.96, with good sensitivity and specificity for detecting depression. Most 
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relevant here, these psychometric properties hold true even in diverse university samples 
samples (Al-Musawi, 2001 ; Carmody, 2005), and is often used in South African studies (e.g. , 
Kagee, Nel, & Saal, 2014; Pillay & Sargent, 1999). 
Anxiety measure. The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993) served as 
a measure of anxiety during the experimental protocol. 
An anxiety measure was included in the study primarily as a control; because 
depression and anxiety co-exist so commonly, and anxiety also has an effect on emotion 
recognition, it was necessary to ensure that anxiety levels, independent of depression levels, 
were not influencing emotion recognition in the sample. The BAI differentiates anxiety from 
depression more effectively than many other anxiety measures (Enns, Cox, Parker, & 
Guertin, 1998). 
The scale consists of 21 items, requiring respondents to report on a scale of O to 3 the 
extent to which various state anxiety symptoms have caused distress over the preceding 
month. As with the BDI-II, the total score ranges from Oto 63, although different cut-offs 
exist here: 0-7 signifies minimal anxiety; 815, mild anxiety; 16-25, moderate anxiety; and 
above 26 suggests severe anxiety. 
Although bearing his name, the BAI admittedly does not have as strong a 
psychometric profile or, indeed, widespread use boasted by the BDI-II. However, the BAI is 
generally a psychometrically-sound measure. It shows good construct validity, converging 
with other measures of anxiety, between r= 0.47 and r=0.81 (see Julian, 2014). Although the 
scale shows substantial correlation with the BDI-II (Wang & Gorenstein, 2013), the use of 
both the BDI-II and the BAI in this study allows for the impact of this limitation to be 
lowered-particularly since the scales serves only as a control here. The BAI has shown good 
psychometric properties in diverse university samples (Al-Musawi, 2001; Creamer, Foran, & 
Bell, 1995), and is often used in South Africa ( e.g., Le Roux & Kemp, 2009; Nel & Kagee, 
2013). 
Schema measure. The short form of the Young Schema Questionnaire (YSQ-S3; J. 
E. Young, 2005) measured the extent of negative schemas in participants. Although initially 
developed in conjunction with Young' s schema therapy, a variant of cognitive therapy, the 
questionnaire has come to be regarded as a reliable and useful measure of maladaptive 
schemas in both psychopathological and healthy individuals . The most recent iteration is 
available in short and long forms, containing 75 and 205 items respectively, although the 
former is used much more commonly in research . The short form contains 18 schemas and 
the long form 19, with the short form simply containing the items of the long form that load 
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most highly on those schemas (J. E. Young et al., 2003). As in other research, the short form 
was preferred here simply because of its relative ease of administration, since time was 
limited during the experiment. 
The psychometric properties of the YSQ short-form are similar to the long form. 
Additionally, the short form shows good internal consistency and discriminative validity (Oei 
& Baranoff, 2007). The short form has been used extensively in cross-cultural settings, with, 
for example, Turkish and Finnish examples existing (Saariaho, Saariaho, Karila, & 
Joukamaa, 2009; Soygiit, Karaosmanoglu, & Cakir, 2009). At least one study has directly 
measured the psychometric properties of the English version in a culturally-diverse sample, 
finding similar properties in the responses of Australian and Korean respondents (Oei & 
Baranoff, 2007). Unfortunately, specific details of the psychometric properties of the current 
version of the scale are currently unavailable. Similarly, the psychometric properties specific 
to the local population are unknown, although the scale has been used previously in South 
African research ( e.g., Lochner et al. , 2005). 
Mood induction. Participants were induced to positive or negative mood states 
through an autobiographical writing task combined with mood-inducing background music. 
Specifically, participants in these two conditions were asked to write down the details of their 
happiest or saddest life experiences, while music shown to elicit positive or negative mood 
played via headphones. Participants wrote on a single blank piece of paper, and were 
informed before beginning that this page would remain anonymous. Pen and paper was 
preferred over electronic input in this experiment only because an informal pilot of the study 
(not reported here) revealed a considerable and limiting variation of typing speed of 
participants. The effects of written autobiographical tasks on mood have long been known 
(e.g., Baker & Guttfreund, 1993) and allow for a simple, ethical means of mood induction. 
Similarly, there is a strong and long-standing empirical foundation for the effect of music on 
mood (e.g., Pignatiello, Camp, & Rasar, 1986). The combination of these two techniques has 
been used successfully in many studies (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; Petra Claudia 
Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010). The choice of music used was based on previous validation 
(Petra C. Schmid et al. , 2011) and included Eine Kleine Nachtrnusik by Mozart for the happy 
condition, and Adagio for Strings, by Samuel Barber, for the sad condition. Those in the 
neutral condition were asked to recall their typical evening routine while listening to a piece 
of classical music considered soothing- Neptune the Mystic, by Gustav Holst. 
Mood measure. A visual-analogue scale was used to measure the effectiveness of the 
mood induction. Specifically, a 12cm printed line with a dot on each end, the left-most point 
labelled ' extremely sad' and the right-most point ' extremely happy' allowed participants to 
indicate, by placing a mark along this line, how they felt after the mood induction. This 
technique has been used successfully in other research (Petra Claudia Schmid & Schmid 
Mast, 2010) and provides a quick and simple indication of mood. 
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Other scales, particularly the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988), which has been validated and used in many studies (Karim, Weisz, & 
Rehman, 2011 ; Thompson, 2007), could have been used here, but were excluded for two 
reasons. First, although a short-form of the PANAS exists (Thompson, 2007), its 
administration is still lengthier than a visual analogue scale. More importantly, though, the 
items on this scale presuppose a nuanced English vocabulary, which is not necessarily the 
case in the present culturally-diverse sample. 
Emotion recognition tasks. 
Facial emotion recognition. Images from the Pictures of Facial Affect series (POFA; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1971) measured facial emotion recognition. The set as a whole consists of 
110 black-and-white photographs of 13 actors producing prototypical expressions of the basic 
emotions. For this study, sets of expressions of happiness, sadness, anger, and fear from 3 
male and 3 female actors was used. To increase task difficulty, these photos were morphed 
with neutral expressions at three different rates: 25%, 50%, and 75%. This configuration 
yields a set of 72 stimuli. No expressions at full intensity were included to avoid a likely 
ceiling effect (Milders et al., 2010). An equal number of male and female faces was needed 
because of the known variability in recognition accuracy dependent on the gender of actors in 
the stimuli (Erwin, Gur, & Gur, 1992). 
Additionally, there are two validity considerations regarding the usage of the POF A 
here. First, all the actors in the photos are white, which has the risk of causing race-based 
biases in responses: Individuals typically recognise the emotions of members of their own 
race or culture more easily (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Elfenbein, Beaupre, Levesque, & 
Hess, 2007; but see Papesh & Goldinger, 2009), and the current sample is racially diverse. To 
control for this possible effect, participants were matched as closely as possible on race. It is, 
however, worth noting that South Africa is an exceptionally diverse nation, wherein 
individuals are frequently exposed to many races-and recognition biases are negatively 
correlated with multicultural exposure (Beaupre & Hess, 2006; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). 
Second, as mentioned above, the actors in the POF A look outdated. More than a trivial 
aesthetic complaint, this fact may draw participants' attention to irrelevant details, such as an 
unusual haircut (Papesh & Goldinger, 2009). To avoid this potential confound, all non-facial 
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features (e.g., hair and ears) in the images were removed. This is a common technique when 
using the POFA (Naranjo et al. , 2011). 
With the considerable setbacks of the POFA listed above (and later in Discussion), the 
reader may be wondering at this point why, then, another stimulus set was not used instead. 
The simple answer to this query would be that the existing research corpus almost dictates it; 
the POF A series is iconic in the literature, and employing it here allowed for the results to be 
compared with existing research. Many modem batteries ( e.g., the Emotion Recognition 
Index; Scherer & Scherer, 2011) make use of the POFA, and newer facial emotion databases 
are primarily created for facial recognition software development, and are thus inappropriate 
for clinical assessment. Overall, the POF A remain dominant in emotion recognition literature 
(D. Martin, Slessor, Allen, Phillips, & Darling, 2012) and their use here is justified despite 
their shortcomings. 
Vocal emotion recognition. A subset of 64 stimuli from the Geneva Vocal Emotion 
Expression Stimulus set (GVEES; Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001) measured the vocal 
emotion recognition of participants. These stimuli consist of recordings of short, emotionally-
tinged yet semantically-empty sentences spoken by two male and two female actors. 
Happiness, sadness, anger, and fear-laden sentences were used in the experiment, although 
the set also contains stimuli for disgust ( omitted in this study for brevity). 
The technique employed in creating the stimuli provides greater credibility to the set: 
Although many emotion recognition stimuli (including the POF A) simply ask the certain 
actors to convey a certain emotion, in creating the GVEES actors were asked to envisage 
specific scenarios. That is, rather than instructed to "sound sad", for example, actors were 
asked to recall or imagine the death of a loved one. Further, the provided scenarios were 
based on a previous study (Scherer, 1986) of the perceived emotional content and intensity of 
various life events . In doing this, the research team contends, interpretation of the emotion 
states is not left up to the actors, and a more consistent response was obtained during the 
recording. 
To ensure that the stimuli gauge only participants' interpretation of the tone of the 
voices, the GVEES contain nonsensical sentences. These were created from seven-syllable 
sequences, comprised of at least one syllable each of six European languages (Danish, 
English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish). From several sequences, two were chosen by 
a group of vocal communication experts as being best with regards to articulation, language 
neutrality, and structure. These were: "Hat sundig pron you venzy," and "Fee got laishjonkill 
gosterr". Although the sentences contain European linguistic features, and English speakers 
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commonly judge the sentences to be related to German, the stimuli show similar recognition 
patterns across disparate language groups (Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001). Further, even 
though the home language of the current sample is varied, all participants were attending an 
English-medium university, thus having a relatively high level of exposure to this language. 
The reasons for using these stimuli over other available options mirrors the rationale 
researchers used when creating this set. Specifically, some stimuli (e.g., Juslin & Laukka, 
2001) use semantically-valid sentences, such as " It is eleven o'clock". Here, participants 
must deal with the emotional prosody of the spoken sentences as well as the semantic 
content-a situation made more complex by the fact that subtle differences in linguistic stress 
can change the meaning of the sentences. In attempting to solve this problem, some other 
stimuli (e.g., Belin, Fillion-Bilodeau, & Gosselin, 2008) use affective ' bursts' or single 
syllables of speech. Although this avoids the confound of semantic content in spoken 
sentences, the resulting stimuli bear little resemblance to actual speech or common expressive 
outbursts. Further, each recording is less than a second, thus not allowing a similar amount of 
information to be interpreted as would be in regular spoken interactions (Pell & Kotz, 2011 ). 
The GVEES avoids all of the above-mentioned limitations, allowing researchers to focus on 
participants ' interpretation of spoken prosody in stimuli that mimic natural speech. 
Music emotion recognition. Validated pieces of piano music (Vieillard et al. , 2008) 
served as the basis of the musical emotion recognition task. The set consists of 56 short 
(-1 Os) clips of a single piano, based on the Western tonal system and comprising four 
emotion categories: happiness, sadness, threat, and peacefulness. (The category of 'threat' 
corresponds with fear, and 'peacefulness' can be considered a neutral category.) 
The recordings themselves are computer-generated via the Musical Instrument Digital 
Interface (MIDI) standard, in a piano timbre. Because the recognition of emotion in musical 
pieces is a relatively novel area ofresearch (as discussed in the above literature review), no 
norms for these stimuli currently exist besides the initial validation study. Though the stimuli 
are novel, there is a thorough research base surrounding the affective qualities of the Western 
tonal system on which the pieces are based (Balkwill & Thompson, 1999; Janata et al., 2002). 
Of course, as its name suggests, the Western tonal system is neither universal nor the 
only structure on which music can be based and interpreted. For the current sample, however, 
the widespread use of this tonal system in music familiar to those at the university serves as 
justification of cultural validity of these stimuli in the present study. Put simply: It is 
extremely unlikely that any of the participants, being at university level in a highly 
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Westernised country, were sufficiently unfamiliar with this tonal system to have a bearing on 
their performance on this task. 
Insight measures. To assess participants' insight into their own emotion recognition 
abilities, as well as whether they were aware of the hypothesis in question, four items 
questioned: 
• "How good do you think you are at reading the emotions of others?" 
• "What percentage of emotions do you think you identified correctly?" 
• "How motivated were you to identify the emotions accurately?" 
All of these questions, except one asking for a percentage, required a response 
ranging from 1 to 5. 
Stimulus presentation software. OpenSesame (Mathot, Schreij , & Theeuwes, 
2012)is an open-source Python-based graphical experiment builder-essentially an 
alternative to proprietary offerings such as E-Prime. In this study, using this software allowed 
non-restrictive running of the experiment on various university and private computers 
without any concerns over commercial licensing. 
Procedure 
After recruitment, the study essentially consisted of two equal sessions that 
participants were allowed to complete on different occasions- although, with most 
participants wanting to finish their obligations as quickly as possible, only one participant 
opted for this arrangement (with all others preferring a single, longer, session.) 
The first portion of the experimental session consisted of the depression, anxiety, and 
schema measures outlined above. After reading and signing an informed consent form, 
participants sat at a computer on which the BDI-II, BAI, and YSQ-S3 were formatted 
electronically, on OpenSesame. For each scale, items were displayed individually, with 
possible responses displayed on-screen and input via the keyboard. The approximate time 
taken for this portion ranged between approximately 10 and 30 minutes, depending on the 
speed of participants' responses. 
After completing the above scales, participants were allowed a short break if 
necessary; both to ensure that they were not fatigued during the next portion, and because any 
interruptions at a later stage would be detrimental to data collection. This second half of the 
experiment consisted of the mood induction and emotion recognition tasks. 
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For the mood induction, participants put on a pair of headphones, through which the 
music matching their experimental condition was already playing. Having been provided with 
a pen and a blank sheet of paper, they followed the instruction of describing either their 
saddest or happiest memory, or their normal evening routine. After 10 minutes, participants 
ceased writing and rated their mood on the visual analogue scale. 
The emotion recognition battery followed. Participants were seated at a computer 
workstation, with the monitor placed approximately at eye level, and followed on-screen 
instructions. For each emotion recognition subtest, a practice item preceded the actual tests. 
Participants first identified each emotion depicted, followed by a Likert-type rating scale of 
each emotion's intensity ranging from 1-7. 
Upon completing the emotion recognition battery, participants completed a second 
visual analogue scale to assess mood persistence. Following this, they completed the insight 
questions on the computer. This second half of the procedure (including the emotion battery) 
generally took 60 minutes to complete. 
Following the whole experiment, participants were thanked for their participation, and 
received a pamphlet containing information of local mental health organisations. Every 
participant was informed that all participants received this form, and it was in no way a result 
of the responses given in the experiment. Indeed, because the sample was selected precisely 
because of their low depression scores on the BDI-II, it was unlikely from the outset that 
these participants would require referrals. 
Ethical Considerations 
This study followed the ethical guidelines of the Health Professions Council of South 
Africa and the University of Cape Town, and was granted approval by the ethical review 
board of the Psychology Department of the University of Cape Town. Several elements of the 
aforementioned guidelines are worth highlighting here. 
Participants were included in the study out of their own free will, and provided 
informed consent (see Appendix B) before any data was collected. To this end, the nature of 
the study, especially its potential harms and benefits, was disclosed to participants before any 
data was collected. Although students are encouraged to gain SRPP points for course 
requirements, students are able to choose from a variety of on-going studies, or may opt to 
complete a minor assignment if they are not comfortable with research participation. After 
consenting to the research, participants were still free to withdraw their participation at any 
point. 
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Confidentiality is essential in all research, and especially so in studies that collect 
such personal information as depression scores. Among the most sensitive data in this 
experiment was that gathered from the online screening form that, by necessity, contains 
potential participants' names. This form was hosted in a very secure manner, using a cloud 
storage service ( drive.google.com) that utilises 2-step verification (requiring both a password 
and a unique code) for access. Once online recruitment had closed, a copy of the form was 
stored on an AES-256 encrypted flash drive, and all identifying information was removed 
from the online version. 
For data collected during the experimental procedure, participants were assigned a 
code to use in place of their names on all their responses. Only one handwritten form, kept 
securely by the researcher (and only for SRPP administrative requirements), linked 
participants' names to these codes; all data recorded digitally was completely anonymous. 
It is important that the experiment cause no harm. Two areas of concern were present 
in this experiment from the outset. First, the screening procedures had the potential to reveal 
clinically-relevant depression or anxiety scores in those who completed it. To this end, 
contact details of mental health resources (Appendix C) appeared on exit of the questionnaire 
for all students who accessed the form (including those who were not eligible; either those 
who clicked "decline" to the conditions outlined at the beginning, or who were not the correct 
age or on antidepressant medication). The organisations listed included the UCT Student 
Wellness Counselling Service, LifeLine, and the South African Depression and Anxiety 
Group. These were chosen for their low cost ( or free) services that are available to all 
students regardless of financial circumstances. Second, those in the negative mood-induction 
procedure were asked to recall a sad event. Had any participant become overly distressed by 
this, the session would have been terminated and the participant reassured, and offered the 
option of a same-day appointment with counselling services on campus. However, no 
participants were visibly distressed by the mood induction. 
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Results 
Overview of Statistical Analyses Used 
In line with the hypotheses detailed earlier, the majority of the analyses below are 
devoted to assessing the difference between groups on emotion recognition accuracy and 
ratings per emotion. The approach taken here favours multiple univariate analyses, though it 
may initially appear (and would in other circumstances be appropriate) that multivariate 
analyses should precede univariate analyses. Because the hypotheses concern the between-
group difference per each outcome variable (emotion), the linear composite of these variables 
(as assessed by multivariate analyses) is oflittle interest. Further, the rationale of first running 
a multivariate test simply to 'protect' against Type-I error in subsequent analyses is 
questionable-especially in the case of ANOV As following a MANOV A (Bray & Maxwell, 
1982). Analysing each emotion independently allowed for the more-frequent use of 
parametric tests, as often the combined data would violate assumptions necessary for 
MANOV As, yet individual variables met the assumptions for ANOV As. In turn, this allowed 
for effect sizes to be calculated more often, which are arguably of greater importance than 
statistical significance alone (Hojat & Xu, 2004), and offset the increased risk of Type-I error 
created by this approach. (For a more-thorough defence of the multiple univariate analysis 
approach, see Huberty & Morris, 1989). 
Other hypotheses rest on the relationship between emotion recognition performance 
and the extent of maladaptive schemas. Here, arguably, the best approach (allowing sufficient 
insight without an excessive number of analyses) is the use of partial correlations-
comparing experimental performance with schema levels while controlling for depression 
symptoms. Because the YSQ-S3 total score is a nonspecific indication of schemas, a factor 
analysis precedes the correlation analyses. 
A note on data from scales. There exists considerable, long-standing debate around 
the appropriate treatment of data derived from Likert and Likert-type items (e.g., Armstrong, 
1981; Norman, 2010). Specifically, because these items are ordinal, some argue that their 
inclusion in parametric tests is unsuitable. However, it is reasonable in some cases to 
acknowledge that, though individual items are indeed ordinal, total scale scores, such as the 
total BDI-II score, can be treated as interval data. This rationale is applied to the BDI-II, BAI, 
and YSQ-S3 scores here, following the example of many other analyses (e.g., de Klerk, 
Steyn, du Plessis, & Botha, 2004), and (when the relevant assumptions support doing so) the 
mean emotion intensity ratings. 
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The case of visual-analogue scales is less straightforward. Some ( e.g.,Kersten, 
Kii9ukdeveci, & Tennant, 2012) argue that, although these single item measures employ a 
continuous scale ( opposed to numbered responses), their data should nonetheless always be 
considered ordinal. Others (e.g., Harms-Ringdahl, 2012) contend that parametric analyses can 
be appropriate- if the data meet the requisite assumptions. This question is particularly 
important here because, as reported later, each of these methods suggest a different 
interpretation of the measure of mood induction persistence. As such, results of both types of 
analyses appear below for these measures. 
Summary. Thus, in brief: For comparisons of means across groups, one-way 
ANOVA was the first choice-provided the assumptions required for the validity of this test 
were upheld. To this end, all data were analysed using boxplots, means plots, Shapiro-Wilk' s 
test of normality, and Levene' s test of homogeneity of variances; violations of any 
assumptions are reported for each test. Because of the specific nature of the hypotheses, 
planned contrasts followed any significant ANOV A. Where only the homogeneity of 
variances assumption is violated, Welch's Fis reported. When necessary, the Kruskal-Wallis 
H test was used in place of, or in addition to, an ANOV A. All non-parametric pairwise 
analyses used Dunn's test with a Bonferroni correction, with adjustedp values reported. 
Group Similarity 
First, it is necessary to ascertain whether the three groups of participants were similar 
in depression, anxiety, and schema measures- because these factors are known to influence 
emotion recognition. To this end, one-way ANOV A' s were run on BDI-II, BAI, and YSQ-S3 
totals across the three participant groups, as well as the four factors of the YSQ-S3 derived 
from principal components analysis ( discussed later). 
As seen in the table 2 ( overleaf), the groups showed no significant variation in 
depression, anxiety, or schema levels. Although, as could be expected a priori (because 
participants were selected based on low depression levels) the data used in the above 
ANOVAs were not normally distributed, Levene's test of homogeneity of variances was not 
significant for each case. 
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Table 2 
Psychopathology Levels Across Groups: ANOVA Results 
Group 
Negative Neutral Positive 
Measure M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) F(2,100) p 
BDI-II 7.27 (4.11) 7.57 (4.70) 7.03 (5.01) .12 .88 
BAI 15.03 (8.22) 12.66 (8.30) 12.57 (10.81) .77 .47 
YSQ-S3 
Total 216.88 (50.62) 210.77 (47.71) 209.17 (58.87) .20 .82 
Factor 1 107.45 (28.69) 102.00 (28.64) 103.91 (37.44) .25 .77 
Factor 2 89.91 (27.91) 85.74 (25.01) 81.57 (27.50) .82 .44 
Factor 3 46.00 (12.15) 47.28 (12.08) 46.00 (14.97) .11 .89 
Factor 4 43.82 (10.87) 42.65 (11.34) 43.26 (10.87) .09 .91 
Mood Induction 
The next important consideration to assess was whether the mood induction across the 
three groups was successful. Both parametric and non-parametric analyses revealed a 
significant overall difference between groups on the mood measures; however, the non-
parametric analysis did not find any significant differences between those in the Neutral and 
Positive induction groups. Although planned comparisons on the ANOV A did reveal a 
significant difference between the mean ratings of these groups, the effect size was 
considerably lower than the other comparisons. Thus, although there was a large, significant 
difference in mood rating between those in the Negative induction and other groups, the 
difference in mood rating between the Positive and Neutral groups was considerably smaller, 
and of questionable statistical and practical significance. Full analyses are below. 
Parametric analysis. The data met the assumption of normality, and no outliers were 
present; however, variances were not homogenous. The overall ANOV A was significant, 
Welch's F(2, 65.49) = 42.3 , p < .001 , oi= .43. Post-hoc analyses revealed that those in the 
Negative induction group (M = 4.26, SD = 1.94) rated their mood significantly lower than 
both those in the Neutral induction group (M = 7.04, SD = 2.00), t(65.95) = 5.82, p < .001 , r2 
= .34, and those in the Positive induction group (M = 7.93 , SD= 1.24), t(53.75) = 9.24, p < 
.001 , r2 = .61. Those in the Positive induction group had significantly higher mood ratings 
than those in the Neutral induction group, t(56.61) = 2.23 , p < .05, r2 = .08. 
Non-paramatric analysis. A Kruskal-Wallis H test found a significant difference 
between groups, H(2) = 44.01,p < .001. Pairwise comparisons revealed that, although 
significant differences existed between the Negative (mean rank= 24.58) and Neutral (mean 
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rank= 58.66) induction groups, p < .001, and the Negative and Positive (mean rank= 71.20) 
groups,p < .001, there was no significant difference between the Neutral and Positive 
induction groups on mood rating, p = .23 7. 
Emotion Recognition Tasks 
For easier readability, and because the three modalities are not directly equivalent, the 
results from the emotion recognition tasks are presented per modality. Accuracy, rating 
intensity, and misattribution data are considered. 
Vocal stimuli. 
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Figure 4. Vocal emotion recognition accuracy per mood induction group. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
Of all vocal emotion accuracy scores (Figure x), groups differed only on the Anger 
stimuli, F(2,100) = 3.09, p < .05, oi = .01. Planned contrasts showed a significant difference 
between the Negative (M= 54.73, SD= 16.01) and Positive (M= 63.75, SD= 15.59) groups 
on this emotion, t(lOO) = 2.37,p < .05, two tailed, ?-= .05, as well as a significant difference 
between the combination of the Positive and Neutral groups and the Negative group, t(lOO) = 
2.43, p < .05, two tailed, r2 = .05. 
The data for the Anger stimuli upheld all assumptions for ANOV A, but data for the 
three other simuli were not normally distributed. One outlier emerged in the Happiness 
stimuli, and four in the Sadness stimuli. Because Levene's test of homogeneity of variances 
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was nonsignificant for all groups, and nonparametric analyses (not reported here) also proved 
non-significant, ANOVA results are presented here-primarily because they have the benefit 
of effect size estimations, although the presence of outliers should nonetheless be considered 
while interpreting these. The results were: Happiness, F(2, 100) = 1.68, p = .19, ai = .01 ; 
Sadness, F(2, 100) = 1.19,p = .31 , ai < .01 ; Fear, F(2, 100) = .22, p = .81 , ai= .02. 

















Figure 5. Vocal emotion ratings per mood induction group. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
Groups did not differ significantly on mean vocal emotion ratings ( Figure X). 
Mean ratings on Happiness and Sadness stimuli were not normally distributed, several 
outliers existed on all emotion ratings except Fear, and all ratings except Sadness violated the 
assumption of homogeneity of variances-making non-parametric analyses necessary here. 
Four Kruskal-Wallis tests found no significant difference between groups on each 
emotion rating: Happiness, H(2) = 1.02,p = .60; Sadness, H(2) = 1.95, p = .37; Fear, H(2) = 
3.01 ,p = .22; Anger, H(2) = 2.55 , p = .27. 
Vocal emotion misattributions. Groups significantly differed in incorrectly 
identifying Anger stimuli as Fear, H(2) = 11.23, p < .05 . Pairwise comparisons revealed this 
to be due to those in the Negative induction making this misattribution more often (mean rank 
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= 62.79) than those in the Neutral induction group (mean rank = 40.13), adjustedp < .05. No 
other significant differences in misattribution emerged. 
Musical stimuli. 
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Figure 6. Musical emotion recognition accuracy per mood induction group. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
Among the musical accuracy scores (Figure X), only the Peace accuracy scores were 
significantly different, F(2, 100) = 3.24, p < .04. Those in the Positive induction group 
correctly identified more stimuli (M= 74.08, SD = 15.11) in this emotion group than those in 
both the Negative (M = 64.71 , SD= 15.87) and Neutral (M = 65.51 , SD= 19.48) groups, 
t( l 00) = 2.54, p < .05, two-tailed. 
The assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance were upheld for the Peace 
accuracy scores. Two outliers appeared on this group, both in the Negative induction, yet did 
not substantially influence the analysis- as both were on opposite extremes, with their mean 
(64.28%) similar to the overall mean (64.72%) for this induction group on Peace accuracy. 
Because all other emotion scores were not normally distributed, contained several outliers, 
and Happiness and Sadness scores violated the homogeneity of variances assumption, 
Kruskal-Wallis tests were used for these three stimuli groups. Results were: Happiness, H(2) 
= 3.99, p = .14; Sadness, H(2) = 1.59, p = .45; Fear, H(2) = .61 , p = .73. 
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Musical emotion misattributions. Groups differed in the number of Sadness stimuli 
misidentified as Happiness, H(2) = 13.52,p < .001. Those in the Neutral induction (mean 
rank= 61.44) made this misattribution significantly more often than those in the Negative 
induction (mean rank= 45.00),p < .001 , and those in the Positive induction (mean rank= 
49.16),p < .05. 
Groups also significantly differed in the misattribution of Peace stimuli as Sadness, 
H(2) = 6.64, p < .05, with those in the Negative induction group (mean rank= 60.61) making 
this misattribution more often than those in the Positive induction group (mean rank = 42.37), 
p < .05. No other significant differences in misattribution emerged. 


















Figure 7. Musical emotion ratings per mood induction group. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
Groups did not differ significantly on mean musical emotion ratings (shown in Figure 
X). 
For all groups, the assumption of normality was upheld. Three outliers each emerged 
on the Sadness and Peace ratings. The mean of two of the outliers on the Sadness rating, in 
the Neutral induction group, was similar to the overall mean (4.57 and 4.67, respectively), 
leaving only one outlier in the Negative induction group, rating value = 2. All rating means 
except Peace upheld the homogeneity of variances assumption. Following this, ANOVAs 
were run on all rating groups except Peace. The results were: Happiness, F(2, 100) = 1.83, p 
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= .17, oi = .02; Sadness, F(2, 100) = .26, p = .77, o}= .01; Fear, F(2, 100) = .33 , p = .72, w2 
= .01 ; Peace, H(2) = 4.95, p = .08. 
Facial emotion. 
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Figure 8. Overall facial recognition accuracy per mood induction group. Error bars represent 
standard errors 
Groups did not differ significantly on mean facial emotion recognition accuracy 
(shown in Figure X). 
Although the assumption of normality was violated for every emotion and an average 
of two outliers existed in each stimulus group, homogeneity of variances was upheld. 
ANOVA results were as follows: Happiness, F(2, 100) = .72, p = .49, w2 < .01 ; Sadness, F(2, 
100) = .409, p = .67, oi= .01; Fear, F(2 , 100) = .07,p = .93, oi= .02; Anger, F(2, 100) = 
.30, p = .74, oi = .01. 
Facial emotion misattributions. Groups showed no significant differences in facial 
emotion misattributions, F(22, 182) = 1.04, p = .41. 


















Figure 9. Overall facial emotion ratings per mood induction group. Error bars represent 
standard errors. 
Groups did not differ on mean facial emotion ratings, F(8,196) = .88, p = .53. 
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The Happiness and Fear rating means met the assumptions of normality, had no 
outliers, and showed homogeneity of variances, and ANOVAs were run on these two 
emotion groups. However, the Sadness rating means failed tests of normality, and both it and 
the Anger ratings had several outliers, and failed Levene's test of homogeneity of variances, 
making non-parametric testing more appropriate. 
Results were: Happiness, F(2, 100) = .51,p = .59, oi < .01; Sadness, H(2) = 4.40,p = 
.11; Fear, F(2, 100) = .14,p = .87, oi< .01; Anger, H(2) = .47,p = .79. 
Mood Persistence 
Following the emotion tasks, it is necessary to assess whether the induced mood had 
persisted throughout the experiment. Because this question is particularly important to the 
interpretation of the above data, several analyses follow. 
The frrst of these, as with the initial mood rating, is an assessment of the difference 
between groups on their reported mood at the end of the emotion recognition procedure. Had 
the mood induction persisted, one would expect a significant difference to remain between 
the groups. As detailed below, this was only the case in the parametric analysis after 
removing four outliers, and only a small effect emerged, due to differences between the 
Negative and Neutral groups. Again, a linear contrast rather than an omnibus ANOVA is 
warranted here 
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A second useful comparison is the difference in the two mood ratings (pre- and post-
experiment) per induction group. To this end, the results of paired-samples t-tests also appear 
below. This analysis showed a significant improvement in reported mood of the Negative 
induction group, but no significant difference on the other two groups. 
Parametric analysis. The mood persistence data passed tests of normality and 
homogeneity of variance, although one outlier each was present in the Negative and Neutral 
induction groups, and two in the Positive groups (of values 12, 2, 3.5, and 3, respectively). 
No significant difference emerged between mean group ratings, F(2, 100) = 1.136, p = .325, 
oi < .01. 
Because some of the outliers here were extreme and, unlike outliers in previous 
analyses, were due to a single rating per participant (thus carrying greater likelihood of error 
per participant), the ANOV A was run again with outliers removed, which found a a 
significant result, F(2, 96) = 3.542, p < .05, oi = .04. Planned contrasts showed a significant 
difference between those in the Negative induction (M = 6.63, SD= 1.60) and those in the 
Neutral induction (M = 7.61 , SD= 1.69), t(98) = 2.57, p < .05, r2= .05. 
Non-parametric analysis. A Kruskal-Wallis H test, including the outliers in the 
mood persistence dataset, found no significant differences between groups, H(2) = 3.27,p = 
.1 8. 
Paired-samples t-tests. Table 3 shows the results from paired-sampled t-tests across 
pre- and post-experimental mood induction measures. The difference scores of all groups met 
the assumptions of normality, and only the Negative induction group had outliers, which were 
removed for an additional analysis included in the table. As seen below, there was no 
significant change in reported mood in the Neutral and Positive groups before and after the 
emotion recognition tasks. However, a significant change towards more-positive mood is 
seen in the Negative induction group--which remains even after removing the two outliers. 
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Table 3 
Change in Mood Before and After Experiment: Paired-Samples t-Test Results 
Pre-task Post-task Pre-Post 
Induction M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) 95%CI t(df) p r2 
Negative 4.59 (2.60) 6.80 (1.83) -2.21 (2.95) [-3.25, -1.15] -4.29 (32) <.05 .36 
Neg* 4.54 (2.41) 6.81 (1.71) -2.26 (2.32) [-3 .1 1, -1.41] -5.43 (30) < .05 .59 
Neutral 7.05 (2.00) 7.45 (1.92) -0.41 (1.57) [-0.94, 0.13] -1.53 (34) .13 .06 
Positive 7.79 (1.51) 7.14 (1.52) 0.66 (2.21) [-0.10, 1.41] 1.76 (34) .09 .08 
YSQ-S3 Dimension Reduction 
Table 4 
Factor Loadings for Principal Component Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation ofYSQ-S3 
Subscales 
Subscale Factor 
Fl F2 F3 F4 
Emotional Deprivation .150 .770 -.060 .126 
Abandonment .534 .318 .191 .335 
Mistrust .433 .493 .472 .169 
Social Isolation .144 .786 .261 .151 
Defectiveness .404 .700 .121 .063 
Failure to Achieve .396 .522 .092 .167 
Practical Incompetence .510 .430 .159 .114 
Vulnerability to Harm .723 .310 .158 .144 
Enmeshment .808 .057 .061 -.078 
Subjugation .696 .369 .032 .153 
Self-Sacrifice .333 .002 .714 .098 
Emotional Inhibition .312 .665 .378 -.012 
Unrelenting Standards -.009 .198 .863 .127 
Entitlement/Superiority -.046 -.037 .311 .822 
Insufficient Self Control .147 .466 -.263 .592 
Recognition-Seeking .326 .213 .142 .743 
Pessimism/Worry .635 .302 .337 .214 
Self-Punitiveness .411 .179 .389 .123 
Note: Factor loadings > .40 are in boldface. 
Because the YSQ-S3 is composed of several subscales, use of only the overall schema 
score results in a loss of detail provided by variance on the individual subscales. One solution 
to this would be to run multivariate analyses using each of the 18 subscales-but this is 
problematic not only because each subscale is comprised of the sum of only 5 items (leading 
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to lower statistical power), but also because correlation analyses become overly complex with 
so many subscales. Following the example of Csukly et al. (2011), principal components 
analysis (PCA) is used here as a compromise. Because the long form of the YSQ (which 
includes an additional schema) was used in the abovementioned paper, the use of the YSQ 
short-form in following the factors identified is not directly equivalent. This proved 
empirically true in the analysis described below (c.f., Csukly et al. , 2011 , p. 133), which 
identified a different four-factor solution. 
The YSQ-S3 data were suitable for PCA analysis. All variables had at least one 
correlation coefficient greater than 0.3, the overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure was 
0.84 (with all individual KMO measures greater than 0.5), and Bartlett' s Test of Sphericity 
was statistically significant (p < .001). 
Four components with eigenvalues greater than one emerged, explaining 41.2%, 
8.6%, 7.7%, and 6.1% of variance; explaining 63.7% of the total variance. (These values are 
similar to those found by Csukly et al. , 2011 , which were: 49 .8%, 9 .1 %, 7 .1 %, and 6.5%) 
Visual inspection of the scree plot supported a four-factor model, and this model met the 
inclusion criterion of > 0.4 factor loading per item. Table 4 shows component loadings of the 
rotated solution. 
Schemas and Emotion Recognition in Neutral Group 
Here, significant partial correlations between YSQ-S3 factors and emotion 
recognition performance are reported (controlling for BDI-II scores). Because bivariate 
outliers are particularly damaging to the validity of correlation analyses, scatterplots were 
analysed before each analysis, as were stem-and leaf plots for each variable. However, 
because of the very large number of analyses that would be needed to check the scatterplots 
for each factor, only the YSQ-S3 total score was compared with each variable beforehand, 
with the significant individual factors compared via scatterplot afterwards if significant 
results emerged- and only reported if outliers emerge at this point. This is defensible as the 
YSQ-S3 factors are, obviously, derived from the YSQ-S3 itself, and the most likely cause of 
outliers (greatly skewed overall schema levels, or participant data entry response bias) will 
likely carry over to individual factors. As mentioned before, only the Neutral induction group 
is considered here, as they are not subject to possible mood induction activation effects on 
latent schemas and emotion affective biases. All significant results below are at the p < .05 
level, one-tailed, unless reported otherwise. A more-general analysis of overall schema levels 
and recognition accuracy follows the detailed analyses of individual emotions. 
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Vocal emotion recognition. When removing outliers, no significant partial 
correlations emerged between YSQ-S3 and emotion accuracy scores. Sadness intensity 
ratings significantly correlated with F4 (r = .37) even after removing two outliers. Similarly, a 
significant partial correlation between fear intensity ratings and F4 (r = .40) emerged after 
removing two outliers. 
Facial emotion recognition. Only fear accuracy was significantly correlated to two 
YSQ-S3 factors, even after removing one outlier: F2 (r = -.32), and F3 (r = -.35). 
On intensity ratings, F4 showed significant correlations with all emotion groups: 
Happiness (r = .37), sadness, (r =.32), fear (r = .29), and (after removing three outliers) anger 
(r = .32). 
Musical emotion recognition. No musical accuracy scores partially correlated with 
YSQ-S3 factors and, as seen elsewhere, several outliers (and a likely ceiling effect) was 
present for the happy emotion accuracy responses. 
Intensity ratings of sadness correlated with F4 (r = .33) after removing two outliers. 
Fear ratings correlated with Fl (r = -.37) and F2 (r = -.30). 
Overall schema levels and emotion recognition. The above analyses allow an 
investigation into the effect of certain schemas on particular emotions across domains. 
However, it is also worth investigating whether overall emotion accuracy scores (all emotions 
combined) are related to schema levels in the Neutral induction group. 
No overall correlation emerged between schema levels and vocal emotion recognition 
accuracy when controlling for depression, however, a significant correlation did emerge 
between BDI-11 scores and overall vocal accuracy (r = -.31). 
For both facial and music recognition accuracy, no significant partial correlation 
emerged for overall schemas and recognition accuracy, nor did significant zero-order 
correlations emerge between accuracy and BDI-11 scores. 
Global Schema levels and Emotion Recognition 
For reasons explained elsewhere, one should be wary of combining and correlating 
data from all three experimental conditions (this will be expanded upon more in Discussion). 
However, when this dataset is considered as a whole, significant associations emerge between 
emotion recognition accuracy and schema levels, but (in some cases) not depression scores. 
Overall facial emotion recognition, when controlling for BDI-11 scores, is 
significantly correlated with YSQ-S3 scores (r = -.30, p < .001) as well as its factors : Fl (r = 
-.24, p < .001), F2 (r = -.20), F3 (r = -.24), and F4 (r = -.31). However, BDI-11 is not 
significantly correlated with overall facial recognition accuracy (r = -.14, p = .08) 
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Similarly, a significant partial correlation for overall music accuracy and schema 
levels (r = -.17,p < .05) as well as F2 (r = -.18,p < .05), but not for BDI-II scores and music 
accuracy (r = -.14,p = .08). 
The exception to this, however, is overall vocal emotion recognition accuracy scores, 
where no significant correlation is seen between schema levels and recognition accuracy (r = 
-.01,p = .46), although an association emerges between BDI-II scores and this accuracy (r = -
.19, p < .05). 
Emotion Recognition Insight 
Group differences. Groups did not differ on their percentage estimate of overall 
accuracy, F(2,95) = .05,p = .95 , or estimate of motivation, Welch's F(2,64) = 2.75,p = .07, 
although there was a significant difference between groups on self-reported general skill at 
recognising emotions, F(2, 100) = 4.05, p < .05. In this last case, post-hoc analyses revealed 
the difference to be with those in the Positive induction (M = 3.69, SD= .58) significantly 
rating themselves as more accurate than those in the Negative induction (M = 3.27, SD= .63), 
p< .05. 
Insight. More importantly than group differences, though, is whether participants 
showed insight into their performance. Because of no significant difference between groups 
on both percentage estimates and overall recognition accuracy (and because analyses with 
individual groups, not reported here, yielded similar results), these are considered together 
here. The below analyses are one-tailed partial correlations, controlling for induction group 
membership. Two outliers were removed from the Percentage Estimate variable, three from 
overall facial recognition scores, and one each from overall vocal and musical scores. 
Estimated task performance was unrelated to overall facial emotion accuracy (r = 
.004,p = .47). Overall vocal emotion recognition, however, correlated with participants' 
estimates (r = .25, p < .05), as did musical emotion recognition scores (r = .18, p < .05). 
A subtly different question, participants rated how skilled they are in day-to-day 
recognition of emotions. Although one significant correlation did emerge, between 
participants' self-judgements of this skill and their performance on the music tasks (r = .17,p 
< .05), the responses here, including the scale of participants' motivation are not suitable for 
this type of correlational analysis, as will be discussed later. 
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Discussion 
A substantial, perhaps overwhelming, amount of data appears above; the main 
findings, however, are somewhat simpler. Contrary to hypotheses, very few significant 
differences between emotion recognition accuracy and intensity emerged between groups-
many of which were not in the predicted mood-congruent direction. 
More specifically: Those in the Negative induction group were significantly worse at 
identifying angry voices, and were more likely than those in the Neutral condition to 
misidentify angry voices as fearful. In musical emotion: Those in the Positive induction were 
significantly more accurate at identifying peaceful clips than other groups, the Neutral group 
more often attributed happiness to sad clips than both other groups, and more often attributed 
peace to sad clips than those in the Positive group--though the mood-congruent bias 
hypothesis predicts that this trend should exist in the opposite direction. In the facial emotion 
tasks, however, no significant differences emerged. 
Regarding schemas levels of those in the Neutral condition (the only group in which 
this was assessed, as to eliminate the confound of mood induction) significant positive 
correlations emerged between ratings of sadness and fear in voices and the F4 YSQ-S3 
factor. For faces, this group showed a negative correlation between fear accuracy and F2 and 
F3 factors, and the F4 factor showed a significant positive correlation with the intensity 
ratings of all four measured emotion. In music clips, the Neutral group showed a positive 
correlation between intensity ratings of sad clips and F4, and negative correlations between 
ratings of fear stimuli and F 1 and F2 factors. When comparing overall accuracy per modality 
(that is, the total number of correctly-identified stimuli per facial, vocal, and musical stimuli), 
no significant correlation emerged in the vocal domain (although a significant negative 
correlation emerged here with accuracy and BDI-II scores), or in the facial and musical 
domains when compared individually with overall YSQ-S3 scores. BDI-II scores were 
controlled for in all the preceding analyses. 
When comparing the schema levels of all groups with the overall emotion recognition 
accuracy per domain, the YSQ-S3 (and its four factors) showed a significant negative 
correlation with overall facial recognition (and with uncontrolled BDI-II scores); a significant 
negative relationship also emerged with this complete sample and music accuracy scores. 
However, no significant relationship between schemas and overall emotion vocal emotion 
accuracy emerged-although BDI-11 scores showed a correlation with vocal recognition 
accuracy here. 
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On measures of insight, those in the Positive induction group self-reported their task 
performance as significantly higher than those in the Negative induction group--but this was 
not an accurate judgement when tested empirically, with all groups showing similar task 
performance. In testing correlations, only vocal and musical emotion stimuli accuracy scores 
showed significant correlations with self-judgements of task performance. 
As such, the hypothesis that mood induction altering emotion recognition biases has 
not found considerable support in this study. However, there are many other factors which 
should be considered along with these results-not the least of which being the effectiveness 
of the emotion recognition task employed, and the experimental stimuli used. A systematic 
critical discussion of the observed results follows. 
Validity of Sample 
Although long-standing debate surrounds the validity of using university students in 
social science research (e.g., Cunningham et al., 1974; Gordon et al., 1986), with statistical 
analyses showing significant differences between students and the larger population on many 
experimental variables (Peterson, 2001), the use of students in this study is defensible. First, 
there is strong existing empirical evidence on the universality of both emotion recognition 
and depressive symptoms (see Literature Review). Second, the student population at this 
particular university is diverse, and is not subject to the charge of being entirely WEIRD 
(westernised, educated, industrialised, rich and democratic; see Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010), a common criticism ofhomogenous psychology research samples (e.g., 
Arnett, 2008). Third, the present study was conceptualised as a preliminary investigation 
only, with further data collection, including participants from the general population, 
envisioned as part of future research. However, it is nonetheless possible that being limited to 
a narrow population group did have some effect on the results-particularly ( as discussed 
later) since the lack of substantial incentives may have had an effect on participant motivation 
to fully engage with the experiment. 
Mood Induction and Persistence 
Central to a research question concerning the effect of induced mood is, simply, 
whether the mood induction procedure had the desired effect on participants-and (if so) 
whether this mood change persisted throughout the course of the experiment. The answer to 
the first of these questions is at least partly true, as seen in the above analyses (although there 
was only a small difference between those in the Neutral and Positive induction groups). The 
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answer to the second question, however, is slightly less desirable-as it was clear that those 
in the Negative condition showed a significantly more-positive mood by the end of the 
experimental procedure. 
Of course, a mood-induction technique that does not maintain the desired mood for 
the length of the experiment is not an optimal one. However, the choice of mood induction 
was a difficult one, and two principle criteria guided this decision here: cross-cultural 
applicability, and ethics. First, because of the cross-cultural sample, it was necessary to use a 
method that would induce mood as equally as possible among participants. The commonly-
used method of validated film excerpts (Coan & Allen, 2007) may have allowed for a simpler 
induction technique, it is likely that this method would have shown consistent mood change 
across participants. Not only do these excepts have varying effects on those who have not 
seen the full films from which they are drawn versus those who have ( allowing these viewers 
deeper empathy for the characters), but the clips themselves are deeply embedded in Western 
culture, with some content seeming inappropriate for more socially-conservative individuals. 
(For a specific example: A commonly-used film excerpt intended to induce happiness is clip 
which depicts a female pretending to orgasm-not only is this unlikely to induce happiness 
per se, let alone a lasting happy mood, but some may find this appropriate; Sato, Noguchi, & 
Yoshikawa, 2007). 
The second consideration, ethics, eliminated another possible procedure for mood 
induction: situational manipulation. This method involves altering the mood of participants 
by placing them in an emotive situation, and usually involves deception. For instance, a 
dummy task, such as a test with a fixed outcome of high or low results, could lift or lower 
participants' mood, respectively (Coan & Allen, 2007). This possibility was excluded not 
only to limit the unnecessary use of deception, but also because it was possible that the 
disappointment of negative feedback may hinder the motivation of those in the sad mood 
induction in completing the remaining tasks. Thus, the mood induction technique seemed the 
most effective ethical technique for the sample involved. 
Despite pilot testing (not reported here), however, the mood induction procedure did 
not perform as well as hoped-with both little difference seen among the Positive and 
Neutral participants, and with the apparent improvement of mood of those in the Negative 
induction throughout the time-course of the experiment. In the first instance, this is at least 
partly due to the varied level of motivation of participants towards the experiment-
something not unique to this study, using university students (Peterson, 2001), and with some 
participants visibly making minimal effort to complete the autobiographical writing task. In 
the latter case, again, pilot testing suggested that the length of the experimental procedure 
would not exceed 60 minutes-yet actual data collection often exceeded 90 minutes per 
participant. More extensive and representative pilot testing, admittedly, was necessary. 
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Ideally, local (culturally-sensitive and relative) mood induction techniques should be 
investigated for use in future research. Further, the practice of requiring reluctant students to 
participate in studies for course credit (particularly when there is little choice among 
available studies) is problematic-especially when it is known that participants often feel 
used in these situations (Oldfather, 1995; D. P. Schultz, 1969) 
Emotion Recognition Task Performance 
Tasks used. Despite what previous research suggested (Lee, Ng, Tang, & Chan, 2008; 
Petra Claudia Schmid & Schmid Mast, 2010), only a few significant differences between 
groups on both emotion recognition accuracy and intensity ratings- and even where 
significant results emerged, the effect sizes were marginal. (Admittedly, it is also necessary to 
acknowledge that, by definition, a null-hypothesis approach using a p value of < .05 would, 
on average, imply that 1 in 20 significant results are actually type I errors.) 
There are several ( overlapping) possible reasons for this lack of expected bias in 
emotion recognition-each with varying levels of empirical and a priori support. The first of 
these, in line with the above discussion of the mood induction and persistence, is that the 
mood induction procedure simply was not effective enough to induce as strong as mood as 
necessary to elicit possible effects. Emotion elicitation, which has a relatively brief time-
course, is a complex practise (Hickey & Davis, 2003); sustained mood induction is even more 
difficult (M. Martin, 1990). 
Second, some of the emotion recognition tasks used were perhaps not suitable (for 
this or, frankly, any modem research). Specifically, the POF A proved sub-optimal. Their 
inclusion here was based on the fact that they are among the most widely-used set of emotion 
recognition stimuli, and normative data exist for various populations (Trevisani, Johnson, & 
Carver, 2008). However, its continued popularity perhaps exists primarily because of 
previous dominance in the research, and not out of intrinsic value as a research tool. The 
images themselves are dated ( evidenced most notably in the appearance of the actors), 
provided in low resolution, of varying exposure, and, in a few items, out of focus. Further, the 
set is essentially incomplete, with a fear photo missing for one of the actors. This frank 
assessment is necessary because very few studies mention these limitations- which are 
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especially relevant given the $175 fee for the use of the stimuli. Here, again, the creation of 
locally-validated (non-proprietary) stimuli would be optimal. 
Specific to facial emotion stimuli: Although stimuli such as the POF A, which are 
often employed by digitally morphing neutral expressions with stereotypical emotional 
displays, are superior to stimuli sets that morph disparate emotion types ( often of opposite 
valence; see A. Young et al. , 2002), the POF A (and other and other stimuli which might 
morph neutral and stereotypical displays) are also subject to this criticism of low ecological 
validity- albeit to a lesser extent. Because subtle emotion displays involve a discrete set of 
muscles relative to full displays (Wehrle, Kaiser, Schmidt, & Scherer, 2000), an artificial mix 
of two images does not produce an ecologically-valid display of emotion. Regrettably, also, 
despite using morphed images (for a variety of intensities) in this study, a ceiling effect was 
apparent in the POF A clips of 75% intensity. (This may partly explain why the tasks in the 
facial modality showed the least significant results.) 
Similarly, although good existing research provided sound rationale for the use of the 
musical clips (Fritz et al. , 2009), some participants seemed amused by their inclusion-at 
times seeming variously visibly amused, perplexed, and bored. 
Computer literacy. Another relevant (and partly unforeseen) aspect of data 
collection was the wide range of computer literacy skills seen in participants. Although some 
variation in time taken to respond to items presented on the computer is expected, it was clear 
with some participants that they were not very familiar with the use of a computer-and even 
the limited set of keyboard responses required may have influenced the time taken. Although 
response latency of items was compromised in other ways (see below), the additional time to 
complete the entire battery could have conceivably influenced the persistence of the mood 
induction. 
Disparity with other studies. Some of the above-mentioned limitations are also 
present in published studies that found significant results ( e.g., Petra Claudia Schmid & 
Schmid Mast, 2010), yet why is there a disparity? Some of the above-mentioned factors are 
relevant. Additionally, I must concede that the experimental design employed here may have 
been too ambitious- placing a large cognitive burden on participants. Not only were three 
modalities included (with accuracy and intensity ratings), but most participants elected to 
complete the psychometric scales during the same session as the experimental protocol, likely 
only contributing to fatigue and boredom. Additionally, the lack of flexibility with 
undergraduate scheduling (both by hour and date- particularly relative to stressful life 
events, such as exams) may have had undue influence on the results. Not only does affect 
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fluctuate daily in non-depressed individuals (Brabant & Toiviainen, 2014; Hasler, Mehl, 
Bootzin, & Vazire, 2008), a common feature of depression (Gordijn, Hoofdakker, & Reinink, 
1994) but also sleep deprivation (common during high-stress times among university 
students) significantly impairs emotion recognition (van der Helm, Gujar, & Walker, 2010). 
Inability to control for these factors may likely have hampered results, and future studies 
should set out more narrowly-defined recruitment times and criteria. 
Task Performance Insight 
Participants' judgements of their task performance correlated significantly with vocal 
and musical recognition accuracy- perhaps lending more support to the growing picture that 
the facial recognition tasks (the morphs thereof, or their culturally bound and outdated nature) 
were not the best choice for this study. 
In-depth analyses were not possible on the other insight questions (regarding 
participants' judgements of their overall emotion recognition skills, and their motivation 
throughout the task), admittedly because of the poor choice of a 5-item Likert-like scale for 
these two questions- greater variability (perhaps in the form of a visual-analogue scale) 
would have allowed for more nuanced analyses. However, the result remains that those in the 
Positive induction group rated themselves as significantly better at everyday emotion 
recognition than those in the Negative group. It is tempting to consider this as a case of 
depressive realism (where those in a positive mood have optimistically-inflated worldviews; 
(Moore & Fresco, 2012), although there lack of difference between groups, and the 
uncertainty over the efficacy of the mood induction procedure makes this an appealing but 
unfounded conclusion ( especially since this question was at the end of the experimental 
procedure-when induced mood would have presumably begun to wear off). 
Task Response Times 
Another unfortunate result was the realisation that data for response times per each 
emotion item were not reliable, due to the use of a variety of old computers and (the worst 
culprit) thin client terminals (which possess minimal processing power- but instead rely on a 
server, which can cause unacceptable latency if incorrectly configured or overloaded). 
Because response time to emotional stimuli is a topic of focus within depression , future 




This study began from a broad background of depression theory and research, with 
the dual aim of highlighting a relatively-new novel approach to depression aetiology and 
treatment that aligns well with (arguably) the best knowledge and philosophical thinking 
today concerning the mind-brain and its disorders. From this, specifically, arose the question 
of how a particular subset of automatic processing biases-emotion recognition- relates to 
depression. More specifically: Is it possible to elicit similar negatively-biased emotion 
recognition seem in depression by a mood-induction procedure? Similarly: Is it also possible 
to produce positively-biased emotion recognition biases? More than a curiosity, a definite 
"no" to either of these answers would contribute considerably to current treatment theory-if 
it is not possible to alter these biases by mood alone, it become more clear that more than a 
mere mood disorder, depression is inherently linked to maladaptive reasoning and automatic 
biases. Such a finding would also help explain why cessation of antidepressant treatment 
frequently leads to depressive relapse. Going one step further, it may even suggest that any 
treatment that does not address negative schemas or automatic cognitive biases will always 
lead to relapse unless such treatment is maintained indefinitely. This is no small question. 
Did the current study answer that question? Unfortunately, no-not entirely, and not 
for any one reason. Limiting factors included a sub-optimal mood-induction procedure, a 
relatively small sample size, emotional stimuli not validated for the local context, and an 
often unmotivated research sample. However, future studies can surely build on these 
mistakes- including measures such as a matched currently-depressed group for a more 
accurate comparison of response to mood by depressed versus non-depressed individuals. 
One noteworthy finding, though, is that negative schemas, even when controlling for 
depression, are significantly correlated to some aspects of emotion recognition. This finding 
adds further weight to the suggestion that maladaptive schemas are a useful screening tool for 
those at risk for depression, to more-accurately monitor treatment outcomes, and a more 
objective and sensitive research tool. Further, this finding (though modest) is in line with 
predictions of the cognitive neuropsychological model. 
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Appendix A 
DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for Major Depressive Disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). 
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A. Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-week 
period and represent a change from previous functioning; at least one of the 
symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure. 
o Note: Do not include symptoms that are clearly attributable to another medical 
condition. 
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either 
subjective report (e.g., feels sad, empty, hopeless) or observation made by 
others (e.g., appears tearful). (Note: In children and adolescents, can be 
irritable mood.) 
2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of 
the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or 
observation). 
3. Significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a change of more 
than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in appetite nearly 
every day. (Note: In children, consider failure to make expected weight gain.) 
4. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day. 
5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others, 
not merely subjective feelings ofrestlessness or being slowed down). 
6. Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day. 
7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be 
delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being 
sick). 
8. Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day 
(either by subjective account or as observed by others). 
9. Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation 
without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing 
suicide. 
B. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
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C. The episode is not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance or to another 
medical condition. 
Note: Criteria A-C represent a major depressive episode. 
Note: Responses to a significant loss (e.g., bereavement, financial ruin, losses from a natural 
disaster, a serious medical illness or disability) may include the feelings of intense sadness, 
rumination about the loss, insomnia, poor appetite, and weight loss noted in Criterion A, 
which may resemble a depressive episode. Although such symptoms may be understandable 
or considered appropriate to the loss, the presence of a major depressive episode in addition 
to the normal response to a significant loss should also be carefully considered. This decision 
inevitably requires the exercise of clinical judgment based on the individual's history and the 
cultural norms for the expression of distress in the context of loss. 
Appendix B 
Informed Consent Form 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
Does Transient Mood Produce Emotion Recognition Biases? An Experimental Study 
1. Invitation and Purpose 
Hi there! You're invited to take part in a research study that will examine differences in 
emotion recognition between people. I'm a Masters in Neuropsychology student, and this 
study will form part of my degree requirement. 
2. Procedures 
If you agree to participate in this study, I will ask to see you once in person, during which 
time you will be asked to judge the emotional content of some faces, voices, and musical 
clips. At the beginning of each session, I will ask you to remember and write down a 
particular emotional event in your life, but what you write will remain completely 
anonymous. 
The session should take no longer than an hour. 
3. Risks, Discomforts & Inconveniences 
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There are no realistic risks in this study. Recalling a negative memory may be a bit upsetting 
for you, but if you become overly distressed by this, we can stop the experiment immediately. 
If you are extremely distressed, qualified clinical psychologists are available on campus. Just 
to be sure, everyone will be given contact numbers of mental health resources after the 
experiment. 
You might also become a bit tired during the testing and, if this happens, you are welcome to 
take a break at any point. 
4. Benefits 
This study includes a screening measure for various psychological problems, including 
depression. Although I am not qualified to provide formal diagnoses, like a clinical 
psychologist or medical doctor would, the screening measure will be able to determine 
whether you should consider psychological treatment. 
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Participation in this experiment will also give you some insight into psychological research, 
as well as a few novel emotion recognition stimuli. Once the experiment is over, I will be 
happy to answer any questions you have or discuss the research in more depth. 
5. Alternatives (Other Options) 
You do not have to participate in this study- it is completely voluntary. If you decide to 
participate, you may stop at any point (although you will only receive the full amount of 
compensation if you complete the entire experiment). 
6. Privacy and Confidentiality 
Your personal information will be kept very safe in this study. In fact, your name will not be 
on any information that you provide, and I will keep all hard-copy data in a locked drawer, 
and all electronic data on an encrypted flash drive. 
The information collected from this research might be published, but there will be no way of 
linking this data to you-especially when it is combined with all the other participants'. 
7. Compensation 
You will receive 2 SRPP credits upon the successful completion of the study. 
8. Questions 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the study, please contact Steven Harding 
([REDACTED]) 
9. Signatures 
{Participant's name} ___________ has been informed of the nature 
and purpose of the procedures described above including any risks involved in its 
performance. He or she has been given time to ask any questions and these questions have 
been answered to the best of the researcher's ability. A signed copy of this consent form will 
be made available to the subject. 
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Investigator's Signature Date 
I have been informed about this research study and understand its purpose, possible 
benefits, risks, and discomforts. I agree to take part in this research as a participant. I know 
that I am free to withdraw this consent and quit this project at any time, and that doing so will 
not cause me any penalty or loss of benefits that I would otherwise be entitled to enjoy. 
Participant's Signature Date 
Appendix C 
Mental healthcare provider contact details. 
Useful Contacts 
UCT Student Wellness Service 
021650 1017 
28 Rhodes Ave 
Mowbray 7700 
Registered Psychologists at a nominalfeefor students 
Lifeline Western Cape 
086132 2322 
24/7 Telephonic counselling services 
South African Depression and Anxiety Group (SADAG) 
www.sadag.org 
011262 6396 
Online resources, and telephonic counselling services 
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